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Abstract
We examine how candidate selection into the supply of policy information
determines its electoral effects. In a nationwide debate initiative designed to
solicit and rebroadcast policy promises from Liberian legislative candidates,
we randomized the encouragement of debate participation across districts.
The intervention substantially increased the debate participation of leading
candidates but led to uneven electoral returns for these candidates, with
incumbents benefiting at the expense of challengers. These results are driven
by differences in compliance: complying incumbents, but not challengers,
positively selected into debate participation based on the alignment of their
policy priorities with those of their constituents.
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1 Introduction
Following classic models of electoral accountability (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Fearon, 1999;
Holmstrom, 1999), much extant empirical research considers how supplying citizens with policy
information, generally about their incumbents, affects what they know about candidates, how
they evaluate those candidates, and ultimately their voting behavior.1 While often demon-
strated to promote programmatic competition, this work overlooks the strategic decision that
candidates make in supplying policy information to the public in the first place. In advanced
developed democracies, candidates may face no choice but to supply policy information. In
more weakly-institutionalized settings, however, selection into the supply of policy information
can neither be assumed nor enforced. Designing scalable initiatives that promote programmatic
competition in such settings requires a better understanding of the incentives candidates face in
choosing to supply policy information and, accordingly, the electoral consequences of doing so.
Candidate participation in such initiatives cannot be taken for granted. The decision to
supply policy information is risky, particularly in clientelistic settings where the returns to
programmatic competition might be limited and uncertain (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013).
Candidates ex ante risk performing poorly, revealing their policy priorities to be disconnected
from their constituents’, and restricting their ability to target campaign promises to small
groups of influential voters. These risks are especially pronounced for leading candidates, who
emerged within the existing clientelistic equilibrium, enjoy greater resources for on-the-ground
campaigning, and are more likely to be attacked by opponents to gain publicity. Focusing on
election debate initiatives, which have spread rapidly across developing democracies as a way
to disseminate policy information to voters, accordingly, one leading debate organizer notes that
“the greatest universal challenge that [debate] sponsors face regardless of country or culture
is convincing candidates to take part” (National Democratic Institute, 2014). Illustratively,
incumbent candidates in sub-Saharan Africa have refused to participate in nearly half of all
presidential debates.
We study the electoral consequences of the supply of policy information by legislative
candidates in Liberia, where clientelism is pervasive and the media sector remains weak. In an
effort to enhance programmatic electoral competition in the 2017 legislative election, USAID
1Ferraz and Finan (2008), and Larreguy et al. (2019) show that local media reports on incumbent performance
enhance electoral accountability. However, a series of localized information dissemination campaigns fail to
consistently replicate these media effects (Banerjee et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2015; Bhandari et al., 2019; Dunning
et al., 2019b). Closest to our work, recent studies analyze whether debates can lead citizens to make more informed
voting decisions (Bidwell et al., 2019; Platas and Raffler, 2019).
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and the international NGO Internews organized standardized debates in every electoral district.
The moderators asked participating candidates a series of questions regarding their policy
priorities, which often included district schools, primary healthcare facilities, and infrastruc-
tural investments. Rather than large townhall-style debates, the emphasis was on soliciting
concrete policy promises from the candidates that would then be rebroadcast multiple times by
community radio stations.
We partnered with USAID and Internews to experimentally study how the effects of their
large-scale initiative were shaped by the participation of leading candidates, i.e. incumbents and
and their most serious challengers, which they were concerned would be low. The participation
of these candidates in the debates was considered important, first, so that citizens would pay
attention to the debates and, likely, engage more with the debate information as a result. Second,
because few other channels for disseminating policy information exist, debate participation was
a primary way that constituents could learn about candidates’ policy platforms, update their
beliefs about different candidates, and then potentially vote for those candidates with priorities
closest to their own.
To examine how candidate participation affected the electoral consequences of the debates,
we randomly assigned an intervention designed to more intensively persuade candidates to
participate in treated districts compared to normal intensity in inviting candidates in control
districts. Our intervention was aimed at mitigating the concerns of leading candidates regarding
personal attacks and biased moderators, and at highlighting that the emphasis of the debates
would be narrowly focused on policy proposals. To evaluate the effects of the intervention, we
make use of a rich set of original data sources, including polling station-level electoral results, a
nationwide panel survey of more than 4,000 citizens, a survey of more than 600 candidates who
ran in the election, a survey of more than 50 radio stations, full transcripts from debates, and
around 20 focus groups.
We find that the intervention had striking, and uneven, electoral consequences on leading
candidates.2 The intervention increased the participation of incumbents by a third to 50%, while
the participation of those who we predicted to be their most credible challengers increased by a
fifth to 60%. There was a negligible treatment effect for marginal candidates, who participated
at higher rates absent the intervention. Ultimately, the intervention led to improved electoral
2We provide a detailed discussion of why we focus on, and how we categorized, leading candidates in Section
2.1 and Appendix A.1. In short, for both theoretical and logistical reasons, we focus primarily on the predicted top
three candidates per race. This comprised incumbent candidates (n = 64) and their predicted challengers (n = 155),
which together we denote leading candidates (n = 219) and represent a subset of the total 984 candidates who sought
office.
2
outcomes for incumbents in the treated districts and worsened outcomes for their challengers.
Consistent across our polling station data and voter surveys, treated citizens voted for incum-
bents around 4 percentage points (pp) more often and for their challengers around 3 pp less
often. These changes in electoral outcomes occurred particularly in districts where we predicted
incumbents to perform well in the debates,3 and where our survey evidence indicates that in-
cumbents had policy platforms that were better aligned with the priorities of their constituents.
Remarkably, 50% of incumbents in treated districts won re-election, compared to 43% in control
districts.
We then establish three sets of results to explain these electoral effects, which contrast with
the results of prior experimental interventions. First, we show differences in compliance with
the intervention between incumbents and challengers. Incumbents who complied with the
intervention were not well known by their constituents beforehand, but their policy priorities
were well aligned with those of their constituents. In other words, incumbents recognized
whether their policy priorities matched those of their constituents and whether their constituents
knew this. In turn, complying challenger candidates, about whom citizens were also very
uncertain, apparently lacked the political sophistication to correctly assess the returns to debate
participation. If anything, they negatively self-selected into debate participation on the basis of
the overlap between their policy priorities and those of their constituents.4
Second, we show that, likely as a result of increased participation by leading candidates,
citizens in treated districts paid more attention to the debates and acquired more political
information. Citizens in treated districts were 0.3 standard deviations (sd) more intensively
exposed to debate content than those in control districts. Similarly, citizens in treated districts
were 0.13 sd and 0.15 sd respectively more likely to exhibit knowledge about the debates
themselves and of poorly-understood policy issues discussed in each debate than citizens in
control districts. As our qualitative accounts corroborate, citizens were more interested in and
responsive to debate information when leading candidates participated. In treated districts,
citizens engaged in 0.25 sd greater political information acquisition. Consistent with prior
studies of legislative debates, this increased exposure led citizens in treated districts to update
their beliefs about candidates (Bidwell et al., 2019; Platas and Raffler, 2019). Citizens in treated
districts updated their beliefs positively (but weakly) about incumbents’ competence and policy
3We do this by running a LASSO model of the debate performance outcomes of participating candidates on
pre-determined covariates.
4This pattern of compliance largely mirrors the self-selection of candidates into debate participation in control
districts. This suggests that the treatment effects of the intervention are likely representative of those of the overall
debate initiative.
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priorities, becoming more certain in their knowledge in the process. However, in treated
districts, citizens experienced negligible gains in certainty about the competence or policy
priorities of challengers, and updated weakly negatively about their competence. Third, aided
by an increase in demand from radio stations, incumbents increased their radio campaigning
in treated districts while challengers reduced their on-the-ground campaigning. This suggests
that incumbent debate participation had a deterrent effect on challengers’ campaign efforts.
The evidence is consistent with the variation in candidates’ ability to correctly evaluate the
returns to participation critically determining the electoral consequences of the debate initiative.
This differential selection into the supply of policy information may also condition the effect
of similar large-scale initiatives, whether candidate debates or other initiatives designed to
enhance programmatic political competition. Most of the non-participating incumbents had
policy preferences that were very poorly aligned with those of their constituents. Had all
candidates participated, therefore, the results could even have reversed what we find. Such
results would match those of randomized small-scale debate interventions, all of which ensured
that leading candidates participated (Bidwell et al., 2019; Platas and Raffler, 2019). Our research
shows that candidate attendance, and therefore the external validity of such results, cannot be
presumed when scaling such initiatives because their effects depend on the attendance of these
leading candidates. Indeed, districts that were not assigned to the invitation intervention saw
only 35% of incumbents and 50% of challengers participating in the debate.
The extent and implications of variation in candidates’ selection into programmatic initia-
tives are likely to differ by context, and we do not seek to extrapolate the exact pattern of our
results to other settings. However, our findings represent a proof of concept in the context of
recent work highlighting the importance of experimentation at scale, since the effect of small-
scale interventions might differ substantially when scaled (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017; Banerjee
et al., 2017; Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017). In particular, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2017) point to
individual non-adoption of the treatment as a key factor explaining the difference in outcomes
between small-scale and large-scale interventions. This lack of compliance may be especially
pronounced when candidates face incentives not to participate in initiatives designed to move
away from the clientelistic equilibrium from which they often benefit. Our results highlight
the importance of investigating who selects into programmatic initiatives to understand their
effects when scaled.
More specifically, our findings contribute to the literature on information and electoral
accountability. This literature shows that such accountability is enhanced through revelations of
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past incumbent performance via broadcast and social media (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Enríquez
et al., 2020; Larreguy et al., 2019), but not necessarily via localized information dissemination
campaigns (Banerjee et al., 2011; de Figueiredo et al., 2013; Chong et al., 2015; Bhandari et al.,
2019; Dunning et al., 2019a). Closer to our work, recent studies that analyzed the effect of
small-scale debate initiatives in which the participation of the leading candidates was ensured
found a leveling of the playing field favoring challenger candidates (Bidwell et al., 2019; Platas
and Raffler, 2019). Other work similarly shows that citizens exposed to the campaign promises
of all candidates learn about candidate policy priorities and vote accordingly (Cruz et al., 2019).
However, none of these studies address how the results of their information dissemination ini-
tiatives might be conditioned by the strategic decision of candidates to supply such information
or not, which in turn may affect their external validity.
Lastly, our results also contribute to recent experimental work designed to reduce clientelistic
campaign practices common in developing democracies (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Cruz et al.,
2018; Duarte et al., 2019). Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) show that programmatic platforms
transmitted through town hall meetings reduced vote buying and increased electoral support
for the candidates involved. Vicente (2014), Hicken et al. (2018), Blattman et al. (2019), Bobonis
et al. (2019), and Vasudevan (2019), however, show that interventions designed to combat vote-
buying practices while facilitating competition on the basis of policy vary in their success. Our
results underscore the importance of variation in the suitability for programmatic competition
among candidates who became prominent under the existing clientelistic equilibrium. This
suggests that recruiting new citizens to run for office and training them in the articulation of
policy platforms could be important forces in shifting towards more programmatic political
equilibria.
2 Background
Since its emergence from civil war in 2003, Liberia has held three presidential elections, three
legislative elections, and two senatorial elections. We focus on the House of Representatives
election of October 2017, in which each of 73 electoral districts elected a single representative
for a six-year term in a first-past-the-post electoral system. Key responsibilities of House
members include making laws, controlling access to development funds, and allocating and
implementing public goods. Representatives are rewarded with an annual salary over $200,000
USD in a country with an annual per capita income of $900 (IREDD, 2016). The relatively low
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barriers to candidacy combined with a fragmented and weak party environment mean that
there are usually a large number of candidates for each office. In the 2017 election there were
984 candidates from 26 different political parties, with as many as 28 candidates in a district.
As one editorial opined, “Rest assured that this is not a healthy expression of diverse opinions.
Everyone wants a piece of the pie.” (Glencorse and Yealue, 2017).
Once in office, legislator performance is varied, with some lawmakers having close to perfect
attendance while others attending as few as 45% of legislative sessions (IREDD, 2016). Dissat-
isfaction with incumbent performance is widespread, with two-thirds of citizens mistrusting
their representative (Afrobarometer, 2015) and more than half of citizens report seeing their
representatives only at election time, once every six years (USAID, 2018). This dissatisfaction is
not the result of citizens being unaware of who their legislator is—92% of our citizen survey
correctly named their legislator—but partially owes to the lack of credible information about
political activity as a result of an underdeveloped media sector and poor infrastructural con-
ditions. While incumbents sought re-election in nearly 90% of districts, less than half of them
were reelected.
2.1 Who runs for office?
We draw on an original survey of 612 candidates to provide some descriptive evidence of
candidate characteristics.5 Throughout this paper we distinguish between three predicted leading
candidates per district and other candidates, and further divide predicted leading candidates into
incumbents and predicted challengers. This assignment of 219 predicted leading candidates—
64 incumbents and 155 predicted challengers—and 765 other candidates is described fully in
Appendix A.1. The objective with this categorization was to facilitate measurement and analysis
by identifying three candidates per district who had genuine chances of success—qualitatively,
there exists a long tail of candidates who run primarily to enhance their profiles and secure post-
electoral favors (Spatz and Thaler, 2018). Moreover, the definition of actual leading candidates,
those whose vote share ranked in the top three of their district, might be endogenous to our
intervention.
In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics by candidate category. Candidates generally
come from Liberia’s elite, with more education than an average citizen, and are overwhelmingly
male (84%). Incumbents are older and possess higher levels of education than challenger
candidates. They are much more likely to possess prior experience in a non-elected government


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incumbent 55.8 0.68 1.00 0.48 0.35 0.87 $61,458 0.16
Challenger 48.9 0.64 0.43 0.30 0.38 0.88 $41,282 0.06
Other 47.7 0.53 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.85 $30,083 0.03
Table displays mean values of column variables for incumbents, challengers, and other candidates according
to our survey. ‘Age:’ candidate age in years. ‘University educated:’ candidate has completed university.
‘Ran before:’ candidate ran for office at least once before. ‘Govt. job before:’ candidate has held non-elected
government job before. ‘NGO job before:’ candidate has worked for an NGO before. ‘Advocacy experience:’
candidate reports having worked on an advocacy campaign before. ‘Campaign expenditure:’ self-reported
campaign spending in USD. ‘Radio station:’ candidate either owns or manages a radio station.
job and are less likely to have experience working for an NGO. Almost a third of all candidates
have previously run for office, and most report experience in advocacy campaigns in their
districts. Candidates report spending substantial amounts—on average above $30,000—on their
campaigns. Incumbents, however, report spending 50% more than predicted challengers and
100% more than other candidates. The differences between incumbents and challengers are
consistent with the substantial literature on the resource advantages enjoyed by incumbents in
developing democracies.
2.2 Campaigning and policy promises
Legislative campaigns are primarily organized by the candidates themselves with little coor-
dination and oversight by the relatively weak national-level parties. Electoral campaigns are
marked by local rallies at which candidates distribute gifts in cash or kind to generate support.
Nearly 80% of surveyed candidates reported visiting most or all communities in their district,
while nearly half reported distributing gifts in most or all communities. During campaign
season, incumbents in particular orchestrate mass campaigns to buy turnout and truck voters
from the capital to their districts (Bowles et al., 2019). A USAID survey in 2015 found that 35%
of respondents were personally given money in exchange for their vote (USAID, 2015).
In this clientelistic context, candidates face few incentives to widely disseminate policy
promises. The candidates exhibit great awareness of the differences in the types and credibility
of policy promises delivered at local rallies versus over the radio, as Table 2 shows based on
responses to our survey of candidates. Overall, candidates believe that promises made on the
radio are more credible than those made at rallies, but they acknowledge the low likelihood of
any campaign promise being kept. Relevant for our later results, incumbents appear to be more
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sophisticated in this regard.







Candidate type (1) (2) (3)
Incumbent 0.73 0.19 0.26
Challenger 0.70 0.12 0.14
Other 0.67 0.16 0.15
Table displays mean values of binary column variables for incum-
bent, challenger, and other candidate respondents based on our
surveys. ‘Different promises:’ candidate believes that candidates
make different promises on radio versus in-person campaigning.
‘Rally credibility:’ candidate believes that promises made by can-
didates at rallies are very likely to be fulfilled. ‘Radio credibility:’
candidate believes that promises made by candidates on radio are
very likely to be fulfilled.
Because candidates lack incentives to publicize policy promises, the wide dissemination of
policy platforms across districts is extremely rare.6 As such, candidate campaigns generally
lack policy platforms, focusing instead on promises of local development (which rarely come to
fruition) delivered through on-the-ground campaigning buoyed by vote buying. The absence
of programmatic information is facilitated by a fractured media landscape. Radio stations are a
potentially important source of access to political information: radio ownership is high at 83%,
and 62% of Liberian respondents report listening to news on the radio every day (Afrobarometer,
2015). However, because the radio industry lacks regulation, the market is fragmented, access
to electricity is sporadic, and sources of commercial revenue are scarce, radio stations frequently
become the mouthpieces of particular political figures and local firms (Kamara, 2017). Indeed,
as Table 1 shows, many incumbents actually own their own radio stations and many more
candidates are informally connected to other stations.
3 Candidate debates
In the run-up to the October 2017 elections for the House of Representatives, Internews Liberia
led a nationwide debate initiative that they hoped would push back against Liberia’s clientelistic
equilibrium and establish the beginnings of a programmatic one by increasing the supply of
policy information to citizens.7 Internews partnered with several Liberian journalist associations
6One of the country’s most prominent newspapers, the Daily Observer, built a “promises tracker” ahead of the
election where candidates could outline their policy platforms. No incumbent did this.
7Other organizations held debates for the presidential race; those debates are not the focus here.
8
Figure 1. District Debate (Montserrado D3)
to organize debates across different parts of the country.8 In each district, a local journalist was
responsible for conducting research about the issues relevant to constituents, publicizing the
debate, and moderating it. The debates took place from mid-August to mid-September 2017. In
total, 129 debates were held across all 73 districts.9
Debate venues were mostly administrative buildings, town halls, and schools. Every debate
followed a simple and uniform structure. First, candidates were asked to outline their campaign
policy promises. The moderator then posed the same questions to each candidate in turn,
and each candidate was allowed three minutes to respond. The first question in each debate
was related to the management of the County Social Development Fund (CSDF), which is
poorly managed, with little oversight or input from citizens. Second, candidates were asked
about how they would spend their Legislative Support Project (LSP) discretionary funds. After
these standardized questions, candidates were asked two or three questions about relevant
local issues based on research conducted by the moderator. Moderators intervened to prevent
candidates from making personal attacks on other candidates.
Debate content was disseminated by partnering with at least one community radio station
in each district that would broadcast and later rebroadcast the debate on average six times,
8These partners were the Press Union of Liberia (PUL), Liberia Media for Democratic Initiatives (LMDI), and the
Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding (CEMESP).
9In districts with a large number of candidates, multiple debates were held, generally on the same day, with
candidates randomly assigned to a debate.
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with rebroadcasting concentrated in the 10 days before the election.10 Internews chose 43
radio stations to rebroadcast the debates, making selections based on the signal strength of the
station to maximize audience size and discarding any stations that were managed or owned by
candidates running for office in that district.11 We estimate that nearly 90% of the population
was covered by a signal from the station broadcasting that district’s debate.
3.1 Invitation intervention
Whether to participate in a debate represents a strategic decision by candidates based on
whether disseminating policy information will help or hurt their electoral bid. In the context of
Liberia, as in many developing democracies, leading candidates generally emerge by developing
clientelistic machines that mobilize voters on their behalf (Bowles et al., 2019). The returns
to programmatic competition for these candidates were deeply uncertain and, potentially,
negative (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013). Many leading candidates expressed hesitation
regarding debate participation, and the partners were concerned that the attendance of the
leading candidates at the debates would be low, which could undermine the potential impact
of the initiative.
The risks to debate participation were particularly acute for the leading candidates, who
were frequently concerned that their proposed policies and competence would be attacked
by other candidates and that moderators would be biased against them. Furthermore, poor
performance in the debate might hurt their candidacy, while committing to a policy platform
would restrict their ability to deviate on both the campaign trail and, eventually, once in office.
Participation also involved non-trivial direct costs given the difficulties of travel in Liberia’s
rainy season. Leading candidates, who possessed greater resources available for on-the-ground
campaigning than other candidates, additionally faced greater opportunity costs of participation.
For less-relevant candidates with more limited resources, debate participation offered a much
clearer positive expected return: they lacked the resources to buy votes or hold rallies, so
participating in the debate represented a significant opportunity for them to publicize their
name and policy priorities.
Therefore, to evaluate the impact of leading candidates’ selection into supplying program-
matic information, we randomized the level of effort associated with debate invitation across
10The audience in attendance at each debate was around 100 people. Election-related violence is a concern in
Liberia and so, to minimize the risk of conflict, in-person audiences for the debates were purposefully kept small.
11The debates were broadcast by fewer than 73 radio stations since some had the ability to broadcast debates in
more than one district. A few stations were discarded due to political affiliations, primarily because they could not
be relied upon to replay the debates in full with no editing.
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districts.12
Rather than experimentally varying the extensive margin of whether candidates were invited
at all, in our treated districts we significantly increased the intensity of invitation activities.
Candidates in control districts were contacted by the relevant Liberian journalist association
who invited them to attend and provided logistical information about the debate. In treatment
districts, this was augmented with three additional components aimed at persuading leading
candidates to attend. First, we sent official invitations via email from Internews with USAID
branding as far ahead of the debates as possible. These invitations included logistical details
and instructions for candidates to contact Internews if they had any doubts about the debates.13
Second, we made phone calls to all candidates around two days before each debate to persuade
them to attend. These were mostly conducted by a high-profile Liberian radio journalist who is
widely known and respected by politicians. These calls were designed to address any concerns
candidates had about the debates and to clarify the objective, structure, and unbiasedness of
the debates.14 Third, we sent SMS reminders to all candidates on either the evening before or
the morning of the debate with reminders and information on where to go.
By emphasizing the credibility of the debates and providing information about the structure
of the debates, the additional invitation efforts served to reduce uncertainty about the returns
to debate participation. As a result, while the intervention was administered to all candidates
in treated districts, as highlighted by our pre-analysis plan, we expected it to be more likely to
affect the participation decision of leading candidates for the reasons discussed above. Among
these candidates, we expected that the intervention would particularly affect the participation
of those who were most uncertain about the return to debate participation.
We also cross-randomized the extent of debate rebroadcasting, which ultimately had no
effect because citizens were likely to hear their district debate even in districts without intensive
rebroadcasting, likely reflecting the level of citizen interest in the debates. Because candidates
were unaware of any differences in future rebroadcasting efforts, we present results where we
pool over rebroadcasting intensity for clarity of exposition. According to our candidate survey,
candidates believed that debates would be rebroadcast roughly two times, with no statistical
difference by treatment assignment.
12Randomizing invitation effort at the candidate level would have raised serious concerns in terms of ethics and
fairness to candidates.
13USAID was the donor funding the debate initiative. We expected their branding to be persuasive since our
candidate survey indicates that more than 43% of the candidates report having worked for an international NGO.




While the debates were well-attended overall, there was substantial variation across districts,
ranging from 11% to 100%.15 Overall 59% of candidates participated, which broke down to 48%
of incumbents compared to 60% of challengers and other candidates. As shown in Table 3, the
reasons cited for participation by our candidate survey respondents varied. Non-incumbent
candidates cited their democratic duty more than any other reason, while for incumbents the
most common reason was the opportunity to showcase their policy platforms to voters. All
candidates viewed the debates as an opportunity to publicize their campaigns, but challengers
put more emphasis than other candidates on the opportunity to demonstrate their competence.
Only a small share of candidates pointed to radio broadcasting as a reason for their participation
or admitted to attending in order to attack other candidates. These differences suggest a greater
degree of political sophistication among incumbent candidates, who prioritized the instrumental
value of the debates in publicizing their policy priorities.
3. Reasons Cited For Debate Participation
Duty Policies Competence Publicity Radio Attack
Candidate type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incumbent 0.40 0.80 0.27 0.40 0.07 0.07
Challenger 0.61 0.48 0.37 0.35 0.02 0.07
Other 0.54 0.52 0.25 0.43 0.01 0.09
The table displays mean values of binary column variables among incumbents, challengers and other candidates
based on our surveys. The candidates were allowed to cite more than one reason for debate participation. ‘Duty:’
cited democratic duty. ‘Policies:’ cited opportunity to present policy platform. ‘Competence:’ cited opportunity to
show off competence. ‘Publicity:’ cited opportunity for free campaign publicity. ‘Radio:’ cited the benefits of radio
broadcasting reaching a large audience. ‘Attack:’ cited opportunity to attack other candidates.
Our candidate survey is also informative about the reasons why candidates were not
present at their debate, although candidates predictably cite logistical issues rather than the
electoral risks they faced in participation. Over 50% of non-participating candidates cited late
notice, while 30% claimed that they did not receive an invitation. Nearly 20% mentioned road
conditions to justify their absence.
Next, we analyze the debates themselves. Using transcript data we confirm that, on the
whole, the unbiased rules of debate moderation were kept and candidates were given equal
time to outline their policy priorities (see Table 4). Candidates varied in how they emphasized
15Since legislative campaigns are only loosely overseen by the relatively weak national parties, we found no
evidence of parties coordinating the debate decisions of their candidates across districts or in response to the
intervention.
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their own qualifications during introductions, with incumbents focusing on their experience
while challengers and other candidates highlighted their educational achievements. The most
commonly cited policy priorities related to district primary schools, health facilities, and the
quality and extent of roads. However, incumbents spoke at greater length about both the County
Social Development Fund (CSDF) and the Legislative Support Project (LSP) funds, reflecting
their first-hand experience with these funds. Finally, incumbents were much more likely to both
be attacked by other candidates and attack others, as their attendance seemed to act as a focal
point for other debate participants.












Candidate type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbent 340.3 0.22 0.33 398.2 224.0 0.19 0.15
Challenger 352.0 0.30 0.26 284.7 218.0 0.04 0.04
Other 345.9 0.27 0.19 269.8 203.7 0.03 0.03
Table displays mean values of column variables among incumbents, challengers and other candidates based on our
surveys. ‘Intro words’: number of words spoken in introduction. ‘Education emphasis’: candidate highlighted
their education in introduction. ‘Experience emphasis’: candidate highlighted their experience in introduction.
‘CSDF words’: number of words spoken about ways to improve management of County Social Development Funds.
‘LSP words’: number of words spoken about priorities for spending Legislative Support Projects funds. ‘Attacked’:
candidate was verbally attacked by another candidate. ‘Attacker’: candidate verbally attacked another candidate.
Qualitative evidence from focus groups suggests that citizens were affected by candidate
participation in the debates and found the presentation of concrete policy platforms to be novel.
As one participant said, “Before the debate, the word ’platform’ was a strange word to me” (Vai
Town, 26 September 2017). Many commented that the debates increased information available
about candidates, noting that “in the past, there was no opportunity created for voters to engage
candidates in understanding their platforms” (Foya, 20 September 2017). As a result, it is not
surprising that citizens took note of participation decisions, highlighting that “we wanted to see
all the six candidates at this debate but only two appeared, which is not good because we are
not hearing from [the] other four candidates” (Massabolahun, 21 September 2017). Some even
wanted debates to be mandatory: “There should be a law binding all candidates to attend the
debate... You can’t be somebody who wants to represent me if you don’t turn up” (Vai Town, 26
September 2017).
Our qualitative evidence also suggests that the debates caused voters to change their as-
sessment of the candidates. One participant stated, “The debate changed my attitude toward
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candidates and helped me discover the hidden secret of some candidates” (Kolahun, 18 Septem-
ber 2017). Similarly, another participant mentioned, “For me, when I reached there, the first
person I wanted to vote for ... well, my mind did not go on him. When I entered inside the
debate and heard them speak my mind started going on another candidate” (Klay, 27 September
2017). Several focus groups pointed to the lack of specificity in candidates’ promises and the
mixed quality of policy platforms. As an example, one participant indicated that “some of the
candidates were not detailed in their explanation on how they going to tackle these sectors”
(Voinjama, 12 September). In particular, some respondents argued that the policy platforms of
challengers were often weaker than those of the incumbents, as exemplified by one person’s
comment that “I did not hear anything new from candidates contesting against the incumbent
because the incumbent was already doing most of these things” (Kolahun, 18 September 2017).
4 Data
Our primary data source is a panel survey of 4,060 registered voters conducted in all 73 electoral
districts in the country. In these interviews, enumerators used tablet computers while making
phone calls to respondents sampled from the universe of active cell phone numbers on the
country’s largest mobile network. The distribution of observations per electoral district naturally
reflects cell phone penetration and rurality. As the descriptive statistics shown in Table A2
indicate, the sample is older, more male, and better educated than the average Liberian.
In Figure 2 we show a timeline of the debates and data collection. Our survey began in early
August, right before the first debates. Most data collection was completed by early September
but concluding the baseline survey in several electoral districts took several more weeks.16 The
overlap of the baseline survey and the live debates is not a major concern. First, we control for
any potential baseline debate exposure using the date on which respondents were interviewed.
Second, for variables that were collected only for the endline survey, the timing of the baseline
survey is irrelevant. Lastly, the intensive rebroadcasting of debates took place beginning October
1, by which time 88% of baseline data had been collected.
We use several other data sources. First, we use polling station-level election results to
assess effects of the intervention on administrative electoral outcomes. Second, we conducted
a survey of more than 600 of the candidates who ran in the election. We employ this data to
16Since the cellphone number sample was stratified at the county-level, sampling in some districts proved
difficult, especially when the county contained both urban and rural districts since, in these cases, most calls went to
those in the urban districts, and so achieving a sufficient sample in the rural districts took longer than anticipated.
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provide descriptive evidence on candidacy, validate important aspects of the intervention, and
provide further evidence of the mechanism behind our results. Third, we use debate transcripts
from each debate for descriptive evidence on the debates themselves.17 Fourth, we conducted a
survey of more than 50 radio stations to gather descriptive evidence about the stations and to
validate their frequency of rebroadcasting the debates.
4.1 Outcome variables
To assess whether the invitation intervention, the debates themselves, and the debate rebroad-
casting were properly implemented, we exploit two main pieces of data. For candidate debate
participation, we use data from administrative debate reports as well as debate transcripts. For
radio rebroadcasting, we use data from the rebroadcast schedules contracted with each of the
radio stations and Naymote, a youth organization, which was hired to tune into each scheduled
transmission to ensure debates were being played, unedited and on schedule. We complement
this data with responses to our survey of radio stations to assess whether contracted and
non-contracted stations also rebroadcast the debates or related content at other times.
To measure our key outcome variables, we rely on our voter survey and polling station-level
data. For all outcome variables, we provide general descriptions in the relevant regression
tables while details on their construction are in Appendix A.4. Whenever relevant, we aggregate
related outcome variables using standardized z-scores as described by Kling et al. (2007).
To evaluate the ultimate electoral consequences of the intervention, we use the self-reported
vote choices of respondents and validate these results using polling station-level electoral results.
17Internews partnered with the Daily Observer newspaper and hired trained journalists to transcribe each debate.
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To measure debate exposure and information acquisition, we asked respondents questions
about the debates, policy issues discussed within the debates, and about discussions they held
with others about the debates. To assess individual beliefs about the policy priorities and
competence of candidates in their districts, we ask respondents about both such perceptions
and associated uncertainty, but only about three predicted leading candidates, as described in
Section 2.1 and explained fully in Appendix A.1.18 We ask individuals about their exposure
to the campaign efforts of each of these predicted leading candidates as well as their beliefs
about the candidates’ competence and policy platforms. For all respondent-candidate dyads,
we split the analysis into the incumbent and a pooling of the predicted challengers. We provide
descriptive statistics for all the raw respondent level outcome variables in Table A3 and for all
the raw respondent-candidate level outcomes in Table A4.
Because we had no control over the local issues that would be discussed in the debates, all
questions about policy priorities were open-ended. These include both the questions about the
policy priorities of the voters as well as their perceptions about the priorities of the predicted
leading candidates. To analyze these priorities, open survey responses were coded by independent
coders with no knowledge of treatment assignment.
4.2 Interaction and selection variables
As stated in our pre-analysis plan, we expect that voting outcomes will be affected by two key
variables: candidate performance in the debate and the extent of alignment between citizens’
and candidates’ policy priorities. In our survey analysis, we asked citizens about who they
thought won their district debate. This performance measure, however, is naturally correlated
with treatment assignment and so in the main analysis we construct a predicted candidate-level
measure of debate performance,19 and use this to predict performance for the full sample of
candidates irrespective of actual participation.
We measure the extent of preference alignment between respondents and candidates using
data from our baseline survey in which we asked respondents to name their top three policy
priorities in their district as well as to name what they believe are the top three policy priorities
for each of the three predicted leading candidates. We aggregate this latter measure across
18This is both because asking about up to 28 candidates would have made the survey prohibitively time-
consuming and because we had theoretical reasons to expect that the invitation intervention should affect the
attendance decision of the most relevant candidates to a greater degree than it would affect other candidates.
19We do this by flexibly estimating a LASSO model of the debate performance outcomes of participating candi-
dates on pre-determined covariates including their gender, incumbency status, party, baseline citizen assessments of
their competence, policy priorities, and certainty regarding both competence and policy priorities.
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respondents to the district level to create a measure of each candidate’s policy priorities. We
then calculate the share of a given respondent’s top issues that are shared with each candidate
to create a measure of preference alignment. We also create a version where we calculate the
average of this variable at the district-level.
To assess differential candidate selection into debate participation, we also use such district-
level measure of preference alignment, along with a secondary measure where we instead
base candidates’ priorities on their own survey responses. This alternative measure, as we
discuss in Section 7.1, suffers from the post-election timing of the enumeration as well as only
being observed for the 60% of candidates who responded to our survey. Lastly, we additionally
consider citizens’ certainty about candidate policy priorities, also aggregated to the district
level.
5 Estimation
We randomly assigned all 73 districts into one of two treatment conditions: low invitation
effort (the control group) or high invitation effort (the treatment group). To assign treatment
conditions, we first pre-stratified based on which of the debate partners was running that
district’s debate. This is because the capacity of the debate organizers varied substantially in
terms of their ability to attract candidates and organize the logistics of the debates. Second,
we blocked on a set of pre-treatment covariates at the district-level to maximize power.20 This
strategy generated 19 blocks, with 3 or 4 districts per block. We then randomly assigned 38
districts to the treatment and 35 to control. Pre-treatment covariates at the district, individual,
polling station, and candidate levels are well-balanced across treatment conditions. Full details
are provided in Appendix A.2.
5.1 Estimating equations
Taking the case where the respondent-candidate is the unit of observation, we estimate:
yicdeb = βTdb + Xicdb + Zdb + θe + ηb + εicdeb, (1)
where yicdeb is the outcome for respondent i regarding candidate c in district d interviewed
by enumerator e in block b.21 Tdb is an indicator for districts assigned to treatment. ηb are
20We blocked on variables described in Panel A of Table A2.
21This estimation approach extends to cases where the respondent is the unit of observation, yideb, and where the
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randomization block fixed effects and θe are survey enumerator fixed effects. Throughout, we
include both district-level covariates Zdb and individual-level covariates Xicdb for which we
provide descriptive statistics in Panels A and B of Table A2, respectively. While we have good
balance on these covariates we include them to improve precision. We cluster standard errors
at the district level, our level of treatment assignment.
At the individual level, we report pre-registered specifications that vary the weighting of
observations to help account for variation in the number of survey respondents by electoral
district. We report specifications where observations are unweighted; weighted by the inverse
of the number of respondents in that district-wave (1/Obs); and weighted by the number of
registered voters in that district divided by the number of respondents in that district-wave
(Reg/Obs).The ‘1/Obs’ weights imply that each district overall is equally weighted in the
estimation, while the ‘Reg/Obs’ weights imply that districts are weighted in proportion to their
share of registered voters. In the Appendix, we provide an additional set of results for all tables
with survey-based outcomes where we instead weight observations to be representative of
district-level demographics.
We consider an analogous specification to that of Equation (1) for electoral outcomes avail-
able at the polling station-level. In this case, instead of individual-level controls, we control
for polling station-level variables listed in Panel C of Table A2. At the polling station-level, we
report specifications that are unweighted, with observations weighted by the inverse of the
number of polling stations in that district (1/PS), and by the number of registered voters at that
polling station (Reg). The weighted specifications help account for variation in the number of
polling stations by electoral district.
Whenever we have a panel for a given question where the outcome is continuous, we
consider the continuous change in that variable between baseline and endline as an outcome
∆yicdeb. When the outcome is binary, we construct an indicator for whether the coded response
changed between waves. The estimating equation remains the same aside from controlling
for whether respondents were interviewed at baseline before or after the first broadcast of
their district debate and its interaction with treatment assignment. Lastly, we also make use
of specifications where we interact treatment assignment with candidate-level covariates Xcdb,
which applies to the interactions discussed in Section 4.2.
Our coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is β, which recovers the reduced-form or intent-
to-treat treatment effect of the invitation intervention. While the treatment effect of debate
candidate is the unit of observation, ycdb.
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participation, or the instrumental variable estimate that we would recover by instrumenting
debate participation with assignment to treatment, is of great theoretical interest, some of our
estimates indicate that the exclusion restriction condition that is required for the IV estimate to
be unbiased is unlikely to hold.
5.2 Presentation of results and pre-analysis plan
In our main results, first, we estimate the effect of the invitation intervention on debate par-
ticipation by candidate type. Second, we estimate effects on electoral outcomes by candidate
type, and assess hetereogeneity by policy priority alignment and predicted debate performance.
These analyses are each consistent with our pre-analysis plan, which predicted that treatment
effects on increased debate participation would be concentrated among leading candidates and
that the effects on electoral support would be concentrated on candidates with better policy
priority alignment and predicted debate performance. We did not pre-register hypotheses that
differentiated effects between incumbents and challengers, or about the main effect of treatment
assignment on electoral outcomes by candidate type.
To parse the results on debate participation and electoral support by candidate type, we
estimate secondary treatment effects on voter and candidate response. First, we assess dif-
ferences in compliance with the intervention between incumbents and challengers. Second,
we estimate treatment effects on citizen attention to the debates and information acquisition,
which we hypothesized would be greater in treated districts. Third, we estimate effects on
citizens’ updating about the candidates, which we also hypothesized would be greater in treated
districts. Fourth, we estimate effects on candidates’ campaigning intensity. We hypothesized
that overall on-the-ground campaigning would not increase in treated districts, due to the
difficulty of spatially targeting campaigning responses after the broad dissemination of their
policy promises. We document and justify divergences from our pre-analysis plan in Appendix
A.3.
6 Main results
In this section we establish our two main results. First, we show that the intervention increased
the likelihood that leading candidates, whether incumbents or challengers, attended their
debates in treated districts. Second, we show that incumbents, especially those whose policy
priorities aligned with those of their constituents and we predicted to perform well at their
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debates, electorally benefited in treated districts at the expense of their challengers.
6.1 Effects on debate participation
First, we assess whether the intervention had its intended effect on debate participation.22 Table
5 reports treatment effects on the attendance of candidates at the debates.23 Column 1 in Panel
A suggests that the invitation intervention led to a 7.7 percentage point (pp) (14% relative to
the control mean) increase in the share of total candidates attending the debates in treated
districts. In Panel B we show that incumbents were 21.2 pp (76%) more likely to attend in
treated districts, and in Panel C we show that predicted challenger candidates were 21.2 pp
(43%) more likely to attend. Lastly, Panel D reports no treatment effect on other candidates,
reinforcing our expectation that the invitation intervention would mainly affect the debate
participation decision of leading candidates.
6.2 Effects on electoral outcomes
Second, we establish that the intervention ultimately affected voting behavior.24 Table 6 presents
treatment effects on vote choice, using both our citizen survey (Panel 1) and polling station
electoral returns (Panel 2). Panel 1 presents a set of specifications testing for whether there
were treatment effects on vote choice, defined as whether the respondent reported voting
for a given candidate at endline.25 Columns 1-3 present the main effects of the treatment
assignment. Columns 4-6 present specifications in which we interact treatment assignment with
the standardized measure of predicted debate performance described in Section 4.2. In columns
7-9, we interact treatment assignment with the standardized measure of policy preference
alignment between the citizen and the candidate described in the same section.
In Panel 1.A., focusing on the incumbent, we find strong positive treatment effects on vote
choice. Incumbents experienced a 4.5 pp increase in respondent vote choice in treated districts.
22Appendix Table A20 shows similar results when we instead aggregate candidate participation to the district-
level, but we focus on the respondent-level results for consistency across first-stage and reduced-form results. Table
A21 further shows that whether the eventual election winner attended and the share of actual challengers who
attended was substantially affected by treatment assignment, as expected.
23In Appendix Table A22 we show that there is no difference in how often the debates were rebroadcast. This is
measured either based on the radio monitors who tuned into each contracted rebroadcast, or based on our radio
station survey that included radio stations not contracted to rebroadcast but recorded as present in a district debate.
24Appendix Table A23 reports that citizens in treated districts show no change in the reasons they cited for their
vote choice in the baseline versus endline surveys, which thus cannot account for our results on voting.
25We pre-registered using an outcome variable defined as vote switching towards a given candidate. However,
since few respondents indicated a concrete vote choice at baseline, using either measure produces qualitatively
identical results. Focusing on endline responses allows us to compare voter responses to polling station outcomes.
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5. Candidate Debate Participation
(1) (2) (3)
A. Share of candidates
Invite 0.077** 0.065** 0.092***
(0.034) (0.030) (0.033)
Control Mean 0.542 0.573 0.557
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Incumbent
Invite 0.212** 0.177** 0.234***
(0.083) (0.073) (0.083)
Control Mean 0.280 0.372 0.299
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
C. Share of challengers
Invite 0.212*** 0.144** 0.220***
(0.074) (0.063) (0.067)
Control Mean 0.492 0.554 0.528
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
D. Share of other candidates
Invite 0.003 0.008 0.009
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Control Mean 0.562 0.583 0.575
Observations 3991 3991 3991
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variables are the share of the respective set of candidates (all, in-
cumbent, predicted challenger, other candidate) who attended a debate out
of all candidates in that district. Panels A-C have 4060 observations; Panel D
has fewer due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence
no ‘other candidates’ defined).
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumer-
ator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted specifi-
cations, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in that district and ’Reg’ is the
number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors clustered at the




Main effect Std. Performance Std. Policy alignment
1. Respondent-level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.045** 0.051** 0.035* 0.049** 0.054** 0.039* 0.041** 0.045** 0.032
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
Invite × Std. ̂performance 0.067* 0.059 0.039
(0.038) (0.036) (0.031)
Invite × Std. policy alignment 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Control Mean 0.278 0.282 0.288 0.278 0.282 0.288 0.278 0.282 0.288
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496
B. Challengers
Invite -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.036** -0.051*** -0.039** -0.039** -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.036**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Invite × Std. ̂performance -0.015 -0.002 -0.026
(0.046) (0.039) (0.043)
Invite × Std. policy alignment -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Control Mean 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
2. Polling station-level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.042* 0.037 0.041* 0.044* 0.036* 0.044* 0.044* 0.041* 0.043*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Invite × Std. ̂performance 0.082*** 0.099*** 0.081***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.026)
Invite × Std. policy alignment -0.016 -0.017 -0.017
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Control Mean 0.246 0.250 0.250 0.246 0.250 0.250 0.246 0.250 0.250
Observations 4618 4618 4618 4618 4618 4618 4618 4618 4618
B. Challengers
Invite -0.029** -0.031** -0.028** -0.033** -0.036*** -0.031** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Invite × Std. ̂performance -0.034 -0.031 -0.037
(0.027) (0.029) (0.026)
Invite × Std. policy alignment -0.000 -0.009 0.005
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Control Mean 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.112
Observations 11385 11385 11385 11385 11385 11385 11385 11385 11385
Weight No 1/PS Reg No 1/PS Reg No 1/PS Reg
Panels 1.A. and 1.B: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether respondent expressed voting for either the incumbent (Panel A) or
a predicted challenger (Panel B) at endline. Columns 1-3 report the main effects, Columns 4-6 include interactions of treatment
assignment with standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance, and Columns 7-9 include interactions
with standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of policy preference alignment measured at baseline. Panels 2.A. and 2.B:
Outcome variables are vote shares over the number of registered voters for the incumbent (Panel A) or predicted challengers (Panel
B) using polling station-level electoral data. We use the district-level analogues of the interaction terms used in Panel 1. Section 4.2
explains these interaction terms further.
Specifications using citizen survey outcomes are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level and
individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in that district and ’Reg’ is the number
of registered voters in that district. Specifications using polling station-level data are estimated using OLS and include block FE,
district-level and polling station-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’PS’ is the number of polling stations in that district and
’Reg’ is the number of registered voters at that polling station. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses.* p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Moreover, the significantly positive interactions with both debate performance and policy
priority alignment indicate that this effect is greater among incumbents who were predicted to
perform well in the debates and whose policy priorities align with those of their electorates.
In contrast, focusing on predicted challengers in Panel 1.B., there are broadly negative main
effects and little evidence of significant interactions. Challengers experienced a significant 4.8
pp drop among respondents’ vote choice in treated districts. Importantly, this negative effect
on challengers’ voting outcomes is not entirely mechanically implied by the positive effect
on incumbent voting outcomes, since our categorization of predicted challengers excludes the
majority of more marginal candidates.
In Panel 2 of Table 6, we use polling station-level data to validate our survey results. These
results reinforce our findings. In Panel 2.A., we find that incumbent vote share in treated districts
was 4.2 pp higher in treated districts than in control districts, albeit somewhat more noisily
estimated. Incumbent vote share is larger in districts where their predicted debate performance
was higher. However, we find no significant interaction with our district measure of policy
priority overlap here, which we attribute to the fact that our sample of district respondents
is not representative and thus might provide a noisy measure of the the alignment between
candidates’ policy priorities and all voters in the district. In Panel 2.B., we continue to find
that challenger vote share in treated districts is 2.9 pp smaller than in control districts, and
there is no evidence of interactions with predicted debate performance or overlap in policy
priorities between challengers and citizens in their districts. The polling station results broadly
support the survey results and suggest positive electoral consequences for incumbents in treated
districts but negative consequences for their challengers.
7 Explaining the results
Our main results suggest that electoral gains accrued to incumbent candidates in treated
districts, particularly when they were predicted to perform well in their debates and their policy
priorities aligned with those of their constituents. These results mirror actual election outcomes:
50% of incumbents in treated districts won re-election compared to 43% in control districts.26
In a context where approval of incumbent performance is generally low, and given the results
of prior experimental interventions, these results might seem surprising. In this section, we
establish three sets of secondary results that together explain these electoral effects: variation in
26This difference is not surprising given that more than 35% of races are decided by winning margins of less than
five percentage points, which approximates the treatment effects on voting outcomes shown in Table 6.
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compliance with the intervention by different type of candidates; effects on the attention paid by
voters to the debates and belief updating about candidates; and how candidates’ campaigning
responded. We discuss each in turn.
7.1 Differential selection into debate participation
Understanding the effects on electoral outcomes demands an analysis of compliance with the
invitation treatment and hence candidate selection into the debates themselves. Few incumbents
attended in control districts—just 35%—whereas the additional invitation effort increased this
number to around 50% in treated districts. We show that incumbents, both always takers and
compliers, self-selected into debate participation, in terms of the degree of their policy priority
alignment with citizens in their districts, more positively than challenger candidates did.
We consider standardized candidate-level measures of (1) policy alignment with citizens in
the district; (2) citizens’ certainty about candidate policy priorities. We follow Abadie (2003) and
Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2013) to compute the kappa-weighted means of these variables for
the various compliance groups. Table 7 presents these estimates when employing the baseline
citizen survey to construct the variables in Panel A, and when employing the candidate survey
to construct the policy alignment variable in Panel B.27 We focus on the estimates based on the
baseline citizen survey. This is because our candidate survey is missing a substantial share of
responses, differentially across candidate type, and was conducted after the election due to
the logistical constraints that entailed surveying candidates while they were campaigning.28
Nonetheless, estimates using both data sources provide qualitatively similar results.
Considering policy alignment, on average incumbents are very similarly aligned with citizens
compared to challengers. However, we only find a positive pattern of self-selection into debate
participation among incumbents. Always-taker incumbents were very well aligned with the
policy priorities of citizens in their districts, while complier incumbents were aligned better
than never-taker incumbents. Among challengers, we find a much less clear pattern. While
always-takers do not seem to self-select relative to never-takers based on their policy alignment
27As explained in Section 4.2, the policy alignment measure based on the citizen survey measures the overlap
between the top three priorities by the candidates, as perceived by citizens as baseline, and the top priorities reported
by citizens in their district. The citizens’ certainty measure is the average reported by citizens in their district. In
turn, the policy alignment measure based on the candidate survey measures the overlap between the top three
priorities reported by the candidates themselves and the top priorities report by citizens in their district. There is no
analog of the citizens’ certainty measure when using the candidate survey.
28Overall response rates are 47% among incumbents, with compliers responding 50% of the time. Overall
response rates are 65% among challengers, with compliers responding only 47% of the time. These differential
response rates by compliance status might bias the estimates based on the candidate survey data.
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7. Characterizing Compliers
A. Citizen survey B. Candidate survey
All C AT NT All C AT NT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy alignment
Incumbent -0.08 -0.31 0.57 -0.58 0.07 1.06 0.86 -0.47
Challengers 0.03 -1.31 0.19 0.16 -0.02 -1.72 0.08 0.10
Policy certainty
Incumbent 0.36 -0.76 0.52 0.43
Challengers -0.14 -1.23 -0.04 -0.06
Each variable is standardized. Panel A uses citizen survey to construct variables; Panel B uses
candidate survey to construct policy alignment variable. Mean of each variable presented for
all candidates (All); compliers (C); always-takers (AT); never-takers (NT). Calculations follow
Abadie (2003) and Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2013).
with citizens, compliers negatively do. Considering certainty about policy priorities, on average
citizens were much more certain about incumbents’ priorities than challengers’. Consistent
with the idea that the intervention allayed concerns about the risk of debate attendance, there
was less certainty about the policy priorities of complier candidates than either always-taker or
never-taker candidates.
In Figure 3 we nonparametrically estimate the probability of a given candidate being an
always-taker or complier across different values of these variables. The plots in the top panel
corroborate a strongly positive self-selection among always-taker incumbents based on their
policy alignment with constituents. Among candidates in districts assigned to the control,
incumbents with policy alignment 1 sd above the mean participated at rates of around 75%.
Those with policy alignment 1 sd below mean participated less than 20% of the time. Consistent
with Table 7, the plots suggest that the intervention induced the participation of incumbents
at intermediate levels of policy alignment. The plots in the bottom panel, in turn, confirm a
substantially weaker self-selection of always-taker challengers on candidate policy alignment.
With respect to complying challengers, in contrast with complying incumbents, we see a
negative self-selection on policy alignment. However, as with complying incumbents, we
observe that there is substantially less certainty about their policy priorities.
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Figure 3. Complier Status by Baseline Candidate Characteristics























Note: Plot presents fitted values from a non-parametric regression of compliance status across standardized values
of baseline characteristics for incumbents (top row) and challengers (bottom row). At a given value of each baseline
characteristic, the fitted value indicates the probability of a candidate type being an always-taker or a complier.
Optimal bandwidths computed using Calonico et al. (2018).
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7.2 Voters paid more attention to the initiative
Next, we assess how voter exposure and information acquisition was affected by treatment
assignment. In Panel A of Table 8, we use a standardized index of our measures of direct
exposure to the debates, including whether respondents heard the debate and how often they
heard them. The results indicate that citizens in treated districts had exposure 0.304 standard
deviations (sd) higher than those in control districts.29
In Panel B, we use an index reflecting factual knowledge about the debates themselves.
The results suggest that citizens in treated districts had factual knowledge of the debates 0.125
sd higher than citizens in control districts. Given that our endline survey began around a
month after the election, the persistence of this effect suggests meaningful differences in debate
exposure. In Panel C we use an index reflecting factual knowledge about a national policy issue,
the management of County Social Development Funds, which was asked about in every debate.
We find treatment effects of 0.156 sd on correctly learning about management issues of these
poorly-understood funds. In Panel D we use an index reflecting broader political information
acquisition relating to discussion about the debates and listening to the radio. The estimates
suggest substantial effects on information acquisition corresponding to a 0.251 sd treatment
effect.
These results provide strong support for the idea that the invitation intervention meaning-
fully affected citizen exposure to political information through the debates.30 They suggest
that the debates were relatively effective at conveying policy information, particularly when
leading candidates participated, which voters in turn discussed with each other. We provide
results disaggregating the components of these indices in Table A18. We additionally show,
in Appendix A.5, that treatment assignment additionally affected levels of broader political
engagement by citizens and the extent to which they report coordinating their vote choices.
Next, we show that the intervention, through increasing both candidate participation and
thereby citizen interest and engagement with the debates, led voters to update about the
competence and policy priorities of predicted leading candidates. We first assess treatment
effects on the standardized change in citizens’ reported certainty about the competence (columns
1-3) and priority issues (columns 4-6) of incumbents, shown in Panel 1.A. of Table 9. The results
29Importantly for our ability to pool districts assigned to different rebroadcasting intensity, as we show in
Appendix A.3, there were no differential treatment effects on citizen exposure to the debates when pooling districts
that were cross-randomized to different rebroadcasting intensities or when restricting to districts assigned to high
invitation intensity.
30This is also consistent with the theory that more deliberation between relevant candidates will increase voters’
attention (Wantchekon et al., 2018).
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8. Debate Exposure and Information Acquisition
(1) (2) (3)
A. Debate listening index
Invite 0.304*** 0.341*** 0.424***
(0.102) (0.105) (0.107)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Debate knowledge index
Invite 0.125** 0.126** 0.165***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.059)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
C. Policy knowledge index
Invite 0.156* 0.230* 0.189*
(0.089) (0.121) (0.100)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
D. Political information acquisition
Invite 0.251*** 0.313*** 0.300***
(0.078) (0.090) (0.091)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variables: Panel A: a standardized index of (1) indicator for whether the
respondent had not heard their district debate at baseline but had at endline (2) indi-
cator for whether the respondent had heard the debate at endline (3) the number of
times the respondent had heard the debate at endline. Panel B: a standardized index
of (1) indicator for whether the respondent’s stated debate winner actually attended
the debate (2) share of candidates respondent claims participated (3) share of pre-
dicted leading candidates respondent claims participated. Panel C: a standardized
index of the change in how many factual questions about CSDF management respon-
dents answered correctly between baseline and endline. Panel D: a standardized
index of (1) change in how much respondents listened to the radio (2) change in how
much they discussed politics with their friends (3) how much they accessed other
sources of political information.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE,
district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the
number of observations in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters
in that district. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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indicate that citizens in treated districts became significantly more certain about incumbent
competence and priority issues, with standardized treatment effect sizes of 0.178 and 0.169 sd,
respectively. In Panel 1.B. there is no evidence that citizens in treated districts became more
certain about the competence of challengers, and some evidence that those citizens became
more certain about challengers’ priority issues.
We then assess treatment effects on the standardized change in citizens’ beliefs about the
competence (columns 1-3) and priority issues (columns 4-6) of predicted leading candidates,
shown in Panel 2. These treatment effects suggest positive updating regarding incumbents
and negative updating for their challengers, but the estimates are imprecise. Panel 2.A. reports
suggestive sizable, but statistically insignificant at conventional levels, treatment effects that
citizens feel more positive about incumbent competence and that they have learned more about
their policy priorities. Specifically, for both outcomes, the treatment effect is around 0.1 sd. In
contrast, Panel 2.B. indicates that citizens updated negatively about the competence of their
challengers and they did not learn about the policy priorities of those candidates. The treatment
effect on challenger competence is 0.1 sd and marginally significant (p < 0.1).
7.3 Campaigning response by candidates
Finally, we consider treatment effects on candidates’ campaign efforts. In Table 10, we report
results on standardized indices of survey responses regarding “on-the-ground” campaigning
by candidates in respondents’ towns (Columns 1-3) and “radio” campaigning (4-6). The on-
the-ground campaigning index incorporates candidates’ visits, distribution of leaflets, and vote
buying in respondents’ towns. The radio campaigning index captures candidate presence on
the radio.
In Panel A, there is a significant increase in incumbent exposure on the radio in treated
districts, but no significant treatment effect on on-the-ground campaigning by incumbents.
Specifically, there is a positive treatment effect of 0.082 sd in incumbent radio campaigning. In
contrast, Panel B reports evidence of negative treatment effects on on-the-ground campaigning
by challengers, but no treatment effect on challenger radio exposure. Challengers reduced their
on-the-ground campaigning by 0.060 sd in treated districts. We provide results disaggregating
the on-the-ground campaigning index in Table A19.
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9. Updating About Candidates
Certainty about competence Certainty about policy
1. Uncertainty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.178* 0.186* 0.179** 0.169** 0.195** 0.192**
(0.105) (0.107) (0.084) (0.074) (0.080) (0.074)
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Challengers
Invite 0.037 0.046 0.025 0.139** 0.118 0.098
(0.066) (0.074) (0.070) (0.061) (0.073) (0.067)
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Beliefs about competence Learning about policy
2. Levels (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.098 0.066 0.093 0.089 0.125 0.091
(0.075) (0.089) (0.082) (0.065) (0.089) (0.073)
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Challengers
Invite -0.078 -0.147* -0.096 0.038 0.027 0.063
(0.075) (0.088) (0.077) (0.065) (0.086) (0.080)
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Panels 1.A and 1.B: the outcome variable in columns 1-3 is the standardized change in certainty
respondents express about candidate competence between baseline and endline, and in columns
4-6 is the standardized change in certainty respondents express about candidate priority issues
between baseline and endline. Panels 2.A and 2.B: the outcome variable in columns 1-3 is the stan-
dardized change in respondent perception about candidate competence between baseline and
endline, and in columns 4-6 is the standardized learning that respondents reflect about candidate
priority issues between baseline and endline.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level
and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in
that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors clustered




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Incumbent
Invite -0.055 -0.075 -0.052 0.082** 0.087** 0.092**
(0.043) (0.050) (0.051) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042)
Observations 3492 3492 3492 3496 3496 3496
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Challengers
Invite -0.060* -0.073** -0.076** -0.025 -0.004 -0.018
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 8676 8676 8676 8684 8684 8684
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variable in columns 1-3 is a standardized index of how often candidates (1) visited
(2) distributed leaflets (3) bought votes in respondents’ communities during campaigning.
Outcome variable in columns 4-6 is a standardized measure of how often respondents heard
candidates on the radio in the two weeks before the election.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level
and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations
in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors
clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
8 Discussion
Overall, the evidence indicates that incumbent candidates were much better at self-selecting
into debate participation than challengers; they seemed better able to recognize when their
policy priorities aligned with those of their constituents and when constituents were uncertain
of this alignment. This effect is clear for both always-takers and compliers, which suggests
that the treatment effects of the invitation intervention are likely representative of those of the
overall debate initiative. Given the specific focus of the debates on policy issues, the results
are overall consistent with incumbents being better equipped to correctly assess the returns to
debate participation.31 Challenger candidates, who frequently had less political sophistication
and experience, appear to have been less successful at calculating the returns to participation.
When leading candidates were induced to participate, citizens paid more attention to the
content of the debates and became more certain about the candidates. This increase in certainty
was mainly for the incumbent, who spoke significantly more on the policy issue questions for
31It is worth considering whether this apparent greater sophistication is a product of prior selection or experience
accrued over incumbency. While underpowered to conduct a regression discontinuity design to account for
selection into incumbency, this exercise provides suggestive evidence that it is experience, rather than selection into
incumbency, that accounts for our observed results.
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which they possessed more experience. Similarly, the suggestive positive treatment effects on
citizens’ perceptions about incumbent competence but negative perceptions about challenger
competence indicate that incumbents were likely to outperform challengers when they were
induced to participate. These results align with both the differential patterns of selection
into debate participation we observe, as well as the the focus group evidence presented in
Section 3.2. The effects on voter response support the idea that incumbents but not their
challengers benefited both in terms of increased voter information about their policy priorities
and somewhat in terms of perceptions of their competence.
Finally, the effects on campaigning suggest that the presence of relatively sophisticated
incumbents in the debates deterred challengers, who spent less time campaigning in person
around their district in treated districts than did challengers in control districts. Moreover,
incumbent debate performance led incumbents to increase their use of radio campaigning to
complement the rebroadcasting of the debates. Suggestively, in our candidate survey, 77% of
incumbents believed that the debates led radio stations to issue invitations for interviews more
frequently, while only 63% of challengers believed they received more invitations. In addition,
68% of incumbents report that the debates led them to change their campaign strategy whereas
only 52% of challengers reported a change. Restricting the data to candidates who said the
debates affected their mode of campaigning, 60% of incumbents said they affected their radio
appearances while only 40% said they affected their on-the-ground campaigning. By contrast,
only 27% of challengers said the debates affected their radio appearances compared to 73% who
said they affected their on-the-ground campaigning.
9 Conclusion
We examine the electoral consequences of candidates’ decisions to supply programmatic policy
information in a weakly-institutionalized, clientelistic setting. To that end, we randomly
assigned an intervention to increase the participation of candidates in a nationwide debate
initiative, which was designed to elicit and disseminate programmatic promises from candidates
running for a seat in Liberia’s House of Representatives in 2017. Policy promises were elicited
from candidates who participated in the debates and disseminated via radio broadcasting.
We find that the intervention had uneven electoral consequences: incumbents who were
induced to attend their debates by the intervention benefited at the ballot box at the expense of
their challengers. These incumbents self-selected into the debates when their policy priorities
32
were aligned with their constituents, and thus they dominated their debates by proposing
policy platforms closer to those preferred by their electorates than platforms espoused by their
challengers. Our results suggest that both the debate content and the mode of dissemination
mattered for this outcome. When relevant candidates attended their debates voters paid
substantially more attention to the debate information and subsequently engaged in more
political information acquisition. Incumbents induced to participate in the debates increased
their radio exposure, aided by increased demand from radio stations, while their challengers
reduced their on-the ground campaigning.
Our results point to the challenges of transitioning away from the low-accountability equi-
librium characterizing many clientelistic democracies. By inducing a subset of self-selected
candidates to compete on a more programmatic basis, our intervention had uneven electoral
consequences that favored incumbents. In this context, there may exist substantial returns to
incumbency, as challengers are usually less experienced and poorly equipped for programmatic
competition. Incumbents, meanwhile, may possess informational advantages enabling them
to better evaluate the return to participation in such initiatives. If such democratic initiatives
are to enhance competition and contribute to shifting from a clientelistic towards a more pro-
grammatic political equilibrium, then they must at least tackle two constraints. First, given the
implausibility of its enforcement, candidate incentives need to be aligned towards participation.
Second, less experienced candidates should receive additional training to face a more leveled
playing field. How to best achieve this remains a question for future research.
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A.1 Classifying candidates as leading candidates
For each candidate we constructed an indicator variable for whether the candidate was a
predicted leading candidate. We constructed this indicator as follows, in a sequential fashion until
there were three per district: (1) if a candidate was the incumbent; (2) if the candidate ran in the
2011 election and placed 2nd or 3rd; and (3) if the candidate was from a top party. We defined
top parties as, sequentially, the incumbent Unity Party (UP), Coalition for Democratic Change
(CDC), Liberty Party (LP), the Alternative National Congress (ANC) and the All Liberia Party
(ALP). This process resulted in three selected candidates in all districts. These predicted leading
candidates are then split into two groups: whether the candidate is the incumbent or whether
they are a predicted challenger, i.e., a non-incumbent predicted leading candidate. The incumbent
ran in 64/73 (88%) of races, and so in the remaining 9 districts all three of these candidates are
coded as challengers. One additional incumbent ran in a new district and is consequently coded
as a challenger. Validating our indicator for top candidates with actual electoral results, we find
that in 50% of cases our predicted leading candidates came in the top three in their district, and
in 71% of cases came in the top five. Given our aim to identify a set of relevant candidates who
had plausible chances at electoral success and voters would be interested in, we consider the
exercise to be successful.
We show in Table A21 that, using the ‘actual’ leading candidates who placed in the top
three in the election—whether actual leading candidates, winner or actual challengers—generates
a similarly strong first stage on debate participation. Using this alternative categorization
generates a set of qualitatively similar results, albeit with a more restricted sample of only those
candidates who were both predicted and actual leading candidates in the citizen-candidate level
analysis. However, given the effects we find on voting outcomes, we consider it likely that the
definition of actual leading candidates is endogenous to our intervention. These additional results
are available on request.
A.2 Balance
We report balance on pre-treatment covariates at the district, individual, polling station and
candidate levels. Balance is assessed by estimating Equation (1) for each covariate as an
outcome, but omitting the individual-level Xi and district-level Zd as controls. Across the
different specifications, we present the coefficient on the treatment indicator Invite to test for
evidence of imbalance between treatment groups. For district-level specifications, we report
A2
specifications where districts are unweighted and where we weight by the number of registered
voters, and use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. For individual-level specifications,
we restrict to the the endline survey sample and consider two types of outcomes. First, we
assign district-level outcomes to individuals in this sample. Second, we use individual-level
covariates collected in the survey itself. We use weights as described in Section 5.1 and cluster
at the district level. For the polling station-level specifications, first we assign district-level
outcomes to each polling station in that district and second we use polling station-level variables
using the fact that 90% of polling places in 2017 were also used in the 2011 election. For all
new polling places we assign district-level averages. We present an unweighted specification,
one where we weight by the inverse of the number of polling stations in that district and one
where we weight by the number of registered voters in that polling station, and again cluster
at the district level. Lastly, for the candidate-level specification we present an unweighted
specification assessing balance on characteristics drawn from our candidate survey, as well as a
weighted specification where we weight by the inverse of the number of responding candidate
types in a given district. We refer throughout to imbalance on the unweighted specification
since patterns of limited imbalance are generally shared irrespective of weighting schemes.
In Table A5 we report balance at the district level. In the unweighted specification, 0 (0) out of
18 covariates are imbalanced at the 5% (10%) level. In Table A6 we report balance in the endline
survey sample when we assign district-level covariates to respondents. In the unweighted
specification we find that 2 (2) out of 18 covariates are imbalanced. In Table A7 we report
balance in the endline survey sample using individual-level covariates. In the unweighted
specification, 1 (1) out of 4 covariates are imbalanced. In Table A8 we report balance at the
polling station level. We find evidence of imbalance on 0 (1) covariates out of 18 covariates.
In Table A10 we assess evidence of imbalance on incumbent quality by treatment assignment.
In the unweighted specification, we find imbalance on 0 (0) covariates out of 3. In Table A11 we
test for imbalance at the candidate-level using our survey of candidates who ran in the election.
Importantly, in Column 1 we demonstrate balanced response rates to our post-election survey
across all candidates, incumbents and challengers across treatment groups. Using the full
sample of candidates, we find imbalance on 1 (2) covariates out of 8. Restricting to incumbents
we find imbalance on 0 (1) covariates. Restricting to predicted challengers we find imbalance
on 2 (3) covariates. We consider balance at the candidate-level to be good particularly given our
primarily descriptive employment of this data.
Overall we find little evidence of aggregate imbalance—whether on political or non-political
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variables—and, when applicable, we control for the variables we blocked on throughout the
analysis to deal with whatever imbalance that might exist.
A.3 Divergences from Pre-Analysis Plan
This study was pre-registered with EGAP (ID: 20171024AA) and AEA (ID: AEARCTR-0002553)
under the title “Turning Up, Tuning In, Turning Out: Experimental Evidence from Liberia.”
Pre-registration took place before endline data collection and any data analysis. In this section
we describe the differences between our PAP and the final paper, as well as the logic behind
them.
A.3.1 Data and estimation
We reorganized some of categorizations of variables from the PAP to fit into more coherent
groupings. This comprised combining ‘Knowledge about candidates’ and ‘Beliefs over can-
didate competence’ into ‘Effects on beliefs about candidates;’ and ‘Voter coordination’ and
relevant parts of ‘Debate exposure’ into ‘Effects on political engagement’.
As we discuss in the paper, we cross-randomized a separate intervention to vary the intensity
of debate rebroadcasting (with either two or ten rebroadcasts) which ultimately had little effect.
Since this additional intervention had no effect and candidates were unaware of rebroadcasting
plans, we pool over rebroadcasting intensity for clarity of exposition. Importantly, however,
we made no multiplicative hypotheses – rather, all our hypotheses were with respect to the
overall intensity of the debates initiative and focused on those districts assigned to both high
invitation intensity and high rebroadcasting intensity. We can demonstrate that all our key
results also hold under this factorial design, but pooling rebroadcasting loses relatively little
granularity and gains substantially in power. In Table A25 we show that the rebroadcasting
intervention did not lead to significantly positive effects on debate exposure in either the full
sample or the sample restricted to respondents in intensive-invitation districts, in spite of being
correctly implemented. As discussed, this lack of effects stems from number of citizens who
heard their district debates when they were only broadcast a few times.
The estimating equation we use in the paper is closest to what we called our ‘base specifi-
cation’ in our PAP (Equation 5). We additionally pre-registered the possibility of constructing
an individual-level instrument for the debate attendance of candidates, leveraging random
assignment of candidates to debates with the incumbent and at different times of day in districts
where more than one debate was held. We found such an instrument to be underpowered
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due to the number of districts which only ended up holding one debate and so do not report
results using it. We also pre-registered a local regression discontinuity design (Equation 8)
leveraging quasi-random assignment to respondents being interviewed before or after the live
debate in their district at baseline, but lacked sufficient within-district variation to pursue this.
Finally, we pre-registered the use of one-tailed tests but report two-tailed tests throughout to be
conservative.
We did not pre-register outcomes relating to ‘on-the-ground’ and ‘radio’ campaigning by
candidates. Additionally, in our PAP we pre-registered the use of a jackknife measure of debate
performance; given that actual debate performance is a function of treatment assignment we
instead use the predicted measure of performance described in Section 4.2.
While our pre-registered hypotheses make reference to the distinction between incumbents
and challenger candidates, particularly differential treatment effects of the intervention on
their participation, we did not pre-register the descriptive analysis we perform regarding their
intervention compliance behavior.
A.3.2 Hypotheses
We reorganised and grouped many of our pre-registered hypotheses, which were generally
made with reference to individual outcome variables, into more coherent aggregated clusters.
Out of the 27 hypotheses we pre-registered, results directly testing 19 of them are presented in
the final paper.32 The eight missing hypotheses fall into two categories. First, we do not report
results relating to the hypotheses using within-district variation in whether citizens at baseline
were interviewed before or after their district debate had been broadcast for the first time due
to the lack of variation mentioned above.
Second, we do not report results for our pre-registered set of hypotheses relating to citizen
attitudes towards the media and the electoral process. We anticipated that citizens in districts as-
signed to more intensive debates would update positively about the neutrality and contribution
of the media to the electoral process due to the novelty and unbiasedness of the debate structure.
We found little systematic evidence of this happening – we interpret this to be consistent with
the campaigning response of incumbent candidates campaigning more aggressively on the
radio in these districts where they were more likely to participate. We report these results for
32Broadly we aggregated hypotheses from ‘Debate exposure and knowledge about candidates’ and ‘Beliefs about
candidates’ into the results on voter response; hypotheses from ‘Preferences and voting behavior’ into the results
on voting outcomes; ‘Media consumption, attitudes, and institutions’ and ‘Debate exposure and knowledge about
candidates’ into the results on voter response.
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completeness in Table A24. The final paper therefore contains substantially less emphasis on
the intervention affecting media credibility than our PAP.
A.4 Variable construction
In this appendix we document the construction of all variables used in the analysis. Unless oth-
erwise noted, these variables come from our panel survey of citizens where we refer to specific
items in our baseline and endline survey instruments using the format wave-question, where wave
is represented by B (baseline) or E (endline) and question is simply the question on the relevant
instrument. Both survey instruments can be found online at http://egap.org/registration/2899.
As described in Section 5, whenever we asked the same question in both baseline and
endline we use the difference as an outcome. We preserve whether variables are discrete or
continuous. For indices, we standardize each component such that units in the control group
have zero mean and standard deviation of one then average them, following Kling et al. (2007).
Table 5:
• Share of candidates: share of the total candidates in that district who participated in their
district debate.
• Incumbent: indicator for whether incumbent participated in their district debate.
• Share of challengers: share of the predicted challengers in that district (see Appendix A.1)
who participated in their district debate.
• Share of other candidates: share of non-predicted candidates in that district (see Appendix
A.1) who participated in their district debate.
Table 6:
• Panel 1:
– Main effect: indicator for whether a respondent named a specific predicted leading
candidate as their vote choice at endline (E-Q45).
– Interaction: Performance: measure of predicted debate performance of a specific
predicted leading candidate, generated by flexibly estimating observed measure
of debate performance and predicting out-of-sample on candidates who did not
participate.
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– Interaction: Policy alignment: measure of preference alignment between respondent
and a specific predicted leading candidate. Defined as the share of the three priority
issues the respondents name in their districts at baseline (B-Q13) that are shared with
the priorities of a given candidate based on aggregating citizen perceptions of that
candidates’ priorities at baseline (B-Q15, B-Q17, B-Q19).
• Panel 2:
– Main effect: Vote share of candidate at polling station-level.
– Interaction: Performance: District-level analogue of respondent-level interaction.
– Interaction: Policy alignment: District-level analogue of respondent-level interaction.
Table 8:
• Debate listening index: standardized index of:
– Change in heard debate: indicator variable for whether the respondent heard their
district debate between baseline (B-Q7) and endline (E-Q14) surveys.
– Heard debate: indicator variable for whether the respondent heard their district debate
at endline (E-Q14).
– Number of times heard: continuous variable for the number of times respondents
reported hearing their district debate at endline (E-Q15).
• Debate knowledge index: standardized index of:
– Debate winner attended debate: indicator for whether respondent’s named debate
winner actually attended the debate (E-Q17).
– Stated share of participating candidates: continuous variable for the share of candidates
in respondent’s district they recall participating in debate (E-Q16).
– Stated share of participating leading candidate: continuous variable for the share of
leading candidates in respondent’s district they recall participating in debate (E-
Q39.2, E-Q39.4, E-Q39.6).
• Policy knowledge index: standardized index of:
– Manager of CSDF: change in whether respondents switch towards correctly identify-
ing Representatives as the primary controller of CSDF (B-Q9, E-Q9).
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– CSDF reporting requirement: change in whether respondents correctly switch towards
believing that it is a legal obligation to report CSDF allocation (B-Q10, E-Q10).
– CSDF citizen involvement requirement: change in whether respondents correctly switch
towards believing that it is a legal obligation to involve citizens in CSDF allocation
decisions (B-Q11, E-Q11).
• Political information demand index: standardized index of:
– Change in radio listening: Respondents’ change in listening to radio between baseline
(B-Q6, E-Q6).
– Demand for non-radio information sources: How frequently respondents sought political
information from non-radio sources such as newspapers, television and the internet
(E-Q7).
– Change in political discussion with friends: Change in how frequently respondents
discussed political issues with friends, family, neighbors and other members of the
community (B-Q8, E-Q8).
Table 9:
• Certainty about competence: standardized change in how sure respondents were about the
competence of specific predicted leading candidates between baseline (B-Q22, B-Q24,
B-Q26) and endline (E-Q34, E-Q36, E-Q38).
• Certainty about issues: standardized change in how sure respondents were about the
priority issues of specific predicted leading candidates between baseline (B-Q16, B-Q18,
B-Q20) and endline (E-Q28, E-Q30, E-Q32).
• Beliefs about competence: standardized change in how competent respondents believe
specific predicted leading candidates were between baseline (B-Q21, B-Q23, B-Q25) and
endline (E-Q33, E-Q35, E-Q37).
• Learning about policy: standardized change in the share of candidate priority issues that
citizens name between baseline (B-Q15, B-Q17, B-Q19) and endline (E-27, E-29, E-31). We
define candidate priorities using the aggregate of citizen beliefs over a given candidate’s
priorities measured in the baseline survey.
Table 10:
• Ground: standardized index of:
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– Whether candidate distributed leaflets or posters in respondent’s community (E-
Q41.1, E-Q41.2, E-Q41.3).
– Whether candidate made campaign visits to respondent’s community (E-Q41.1,
E-Q41.2, E-Q41.3).
– How frequently other people in their community voted for a given candidate in
exchange for money, food or other gifts (E-Q40.1, E-Q40.2, E-Q40.3).
• Radio: standardized measure how how frequently respondents heard candidates on the
radio in the two weeks before the election (E-Q39.1, E-Q39.3, E-Q39.5).
A.5 Effects on political engagement
The qualitative evidence we presented in Section 3.2 suggests that the debates had a catalyzing
effect on political engagement. In this section we quantitatively test whether, by increasing the
attendance of leading candidates, the invitation intervention affected the political engagement
of citizens and ultimately their turnout.
In line with this, in Panel A there are strong treatment effects on a standardized coordination
index capturing whether citizens discussed the debates with others and whether they believed
these discussions led them to coordinate their vote choices. Specifically, citizens exhibit a 0.15
sd increase in coordination in treated districts. Both panels then provide strong evidence that,
when exposed to debates in which relevant leading candidates participated, citizens demanded
more political information and coordinated their vote choices.
Next, we provide evidence that the citizen engagement caused by the invitation intervention
ultimately led to higher turnout. In Panel B of Table A1, we use administrative polling station
data on turnout. Turnout in the 2017 House of Representatives election was on average 1.5 pp
higher at polling stations in treated districts than the control mean of 70.1 percent (2%). Overall,
the results provide strong evidence that greater candidate participation in the debates increased




A. Debate coordination index
Invite 0.153** 0.158** 0.193***
(0.065) (0.061) (0.061)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Polling station-level turnout
Invite 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Control Mean 0.70 0.70 0.70
Observations 5383 5383 5383
Weight No Reg 1/PS
Outcome variables: Panel A: index of variables measuring (1) how much re-
spondents discussed the debate with friends (2) how much this discussion led
to coordinating their vote choices. Panel B: polling station-level turnout in
House of Representatives election.
Specifications using citizen survey outcomes are estimated using OLS and in-
clude block FE, enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For
weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in that district
and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Specifications us-
ing polling station-level data are estimated using OLS and include block FE,
district-level and polling station-level controls. For weighted specifications,
’PS’ is the number of polling stations in that district and ’Reg’ is the number
of registered voters at that polling station. Standard errors clustered at the






Mean SD Min Max
A. District-level variables (n = 73)
Scheduled debate week 4.18 1.39 1.00 8.00
Number of debates in district 2.08 0.66 1.00 4.00
Number of candidates (2017) 13.55 4.81 3.00 28.00
Incumbent ran in election (2017) 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
Share of repeat candidates (2017) 0.26 0.11 0.06 0.53
Log registered voters (2017) 10.23 0.40 9.27 11.06
1st voteshare (2011) 0.31 0.13 0.12 0.82
2nd voteshare (2011) 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.36
3rd voteshare (2011) 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.25
Voteshare HHI (2011) 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.69
Turnout (2011) 0.66 0.05 0.56 0.75
Log population density (2008) −9.51 1.76 −11.91 −5.21
Share over 18 (2008) 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.54
Share with secondary education (2008) 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.28
Share with GSM coverage (2015) 0.71 0.30 0.01 1.00
Share owns a radio (2016) 0.74 0.12 0.38 1.00
Share gets radio news often (2016) 0.76 0.12 0.50 1.00
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016) 10.98 7.60 0.00 23.36
B. Individual-level variables (n = 4060)
Male 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Age 31.73 9.27 18.00 99.00
Highest education: primary school 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Highest education: secondary school 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Highest education: university 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
C. Polling station-level variables (n = 5386)
Number of registered voters in PS (2017) 405.12 74.87 12.00 505.00
Number of PS in VRC 3.57 1.89 1.00 9.00
VRC added in 2017 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Number of registered voters in VRC (2011) 1422.96 770.45 45.00 3995.00
Number of PS in VRC (2011) 3.36 1.59 1.00 9.00
Turnout (2011) 0.63 0.09 0.14 1.01
Share of invalid votes (2011) 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.35
PS covered by partner radio station 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
1/N radio stations covering PS 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.11
Urban PS 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
C. Polling station-level variables (n = 5386)
Number of registered voters in PS (2017) 405.13 74.87 12.00 505.00
Number of PS in VRC 3.57 1.88 1.00 9.00
VRC added in 2017 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Number of registered voters in VRC (2011) 1423.04 770.40 45.00 3995.00
Number of PS in VRC (2011) 3.36 1.59 1.00 9.00
Turnout (2011) 0.63 0.09 0.14 1.01
Share of invalid votes (2011) 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.35
PS covered by partner radio station 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
1/N radio stations covering PS 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.11
Urban PS 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Table presents descriptive statistics relating to all control variables used in the regres-
sion analyses. Sources: District-level variables: Debate variables from Internews. All
2017 and 2011 variables come from National Elections Commission (NEC). All 2008
variables come from 2008 Population and Housing Census. ‘Share with GSM coverage’
comes from Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer. ‘Share owns a radio’ and ‘Share gets ra-
dio news often’ come from Afrobarometer. ‘Avg. N radio stations covering each town’
comes from Internews. Individual-level variables: All come from researchers’ panel
survey. Polling station-level variables: Radio station variables come from Internews.
All other variables come from NEC. 90% of polling stations were in locations where a
polling place (Voter Registration Center, VRC) existed in 2011. For new polling stations
we assign district-level averages.
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A3. Descriptive Statistics (Respondent level outcomes)
Mean SD Min Max
Table 5
Share of candidates attended debate 0.59 0.22 0.11 1.00
Incumbent attended debate 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Share of challengers attended debate 0.60 0.37 0.00 1.00
Table 8
Heard debate between baseline and endline 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Heard debate at endline 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Number of times heard debate 0.46 1.06 0.00 24.00
Debate winner attended debate 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Stated share of participating candidates 0.12 0.29 0.00 2.53
Stated incumbent debate participation 0.16 0.34 0.00 1.00
Switches to correct CSDF controller 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Switches to correct requirement for CSDF reporting 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Switches to correct requirement for CSDF citizen engagement 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Change in radio listening 0.26 2.17 -6.00 6.00
Demand for non-radio information sources 5.01 2.15 0.00 7.00
Change in political discussion with friends -0.07 2.30 -6.00 6.00
Table A1
Discussed debate with friends 1.01 1.61 0.00 5.00
Discussion led to coordination 1.06 1.76 0.00 5.00
Table A1 (PS-level)
Turnout 0.70 0.11 0.00 1.00
Table A1 (PS-level)
Turnout 0.70 0.11 0.00 1.00
Table presents descriptive statistics relating to all unstandardized, disaggregated outcomes vari-
ables used in the respondent-level regressions as outcome variables.
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A4. Descriptive Statistics (Respondent-candidate level outcomes)
Incumbent Challengers
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Table 6
Switches to voting for candidate 0.16 0.51 -1.00 1.00 0.09 0.37 -1.00 1.00
Measure of debate performance 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.70 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.83
Measure of policy match 0.42 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.28 0.00 1.00
Table 9
Change in certainty of candidate competence 0.08 1.40 -4.00 4.00 0.36 1.53 -4.00 4.00
Change in certainty of candidate priority issues -0.03 1.63 -4.00 4.00 -0.02 1.58 -4.00 4.00
Change in assessment of candidate competence 0.28 1.44 -4.00 4.00 0.12 1.23 -4.00 4.00
Change in share of candidate priorities named 0.02 0.41 -1.00 1.00 0.03 0.42 -1.00 1.00
Table 10
Frequency of hearing candidate on radio 2.95 1.14 0.00 5.00 2.67 1.13 0.00 5.00
Candidate distributed leaflets in locality 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00
Candidate visited locality 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Frequency of candidate vote buying 2.28 1.39 1.00 5.00 2.10 1.28 1.00 5.00
Table 6 (PS-level)
Vote share 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.99
Measure of debate performance 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.68 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.75
Measure of policy alignment 0.43 0.09 0.16 0.59 0.43 0.09 0.00 0.64
Table 6 (PS-level)
Vote share 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.99
Measure of debate performance 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.68 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.75
Measure of policy alignment 0.43 0.09 0.16 0.59 0.43 0.09 0.00 0.64
Table presents descriptive statistics relating to all unstandardized, disaggregated outcomes variables used in the




VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 3rd place (2011)
Invite -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008 -0.000 -0.001
(0.024) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Control Mean 0.322 0.309 0.178 0.183 0.129 0.129
Turnout (2011) Share ran in 2011 VS HHI (2011)
Invite -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.019 -0.006 -0.009
(0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Control Mean 0.661 0.667 0.258 0.266 0.198 0.189
N. candidates (2017) Incumbent ran (2017) Number of debates
Invite -0.509 -0.670 -0.019 -0.052 -0.083 -0.131
(0.833) (0.928) (0.082) (0.078) (0.126) (0.140)
Control Mean 13.634 14.780 0.831 0.886 2.115 2.256
Log pop. dens. (2008) Log reg. voters (2017) GSM coverage (2016)
Invite 0.254 0.160 0.056 0.060 0.032 0.005
(0.365) (0.370) (0.061) (0.055) (0.062) (0.055)
Control Mean -9.847 -9.108 10.214 10.351 0.645 0.773
Share owns radio (2015) Share radio news (2015) Radio coverage (2016)
Invite -0.019 -0.034 -0.017 -0.038 -0.109 0.024
(0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (1.347) (1.384)
Control Mean 0.755 0.773 0.767 0.780 10.051 12.830
Debate week Share sec. ed. (2008) Share 18+ (2008)
Invite 0.028 -0.030 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.215) (0.209) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Control Mean 3.980 3.979 0.137 0.154 0.483 0.487
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73
Weight None Reg None Reg None Reg
Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A2.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors clustered at the
district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A6. Individual-level Balance (district covariates)
VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 3rd place (2011)
Invite 0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Control Mean 0.298 0.308 0.308 0.185 0.182 0.183 0.129 0.128 0.129
Turnout (2011) Share ran in 2011 VS HHI (2011)
Invite 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.043** -0.012 -0.019 0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Control Mean 0.665 0.659 0.667 0.275 0.270 0.266 0.181 0.189 0.188
N. candidates (2017) Incumbent ran (2017) Number of debates
Invite -0.642 -0.549 -0.710 -0.072 -0.024 -0.057 -0.117 -0.091 -0.139
(0.757) (0.709) (0.795) (0.074) (0.070) (0.067) (0.108) (0.108) (0.120)
Control Mean 15.084 13.963 14.833 0.912 0.860 0.889 2.291 2.152 2.265
Log pop. dens. (2008) Log reg. voters (2017) GSM coverage (2016)
Invite 0.207 0.246 0.149 0.072 0.055 0.059 0.029 0.032 0.004
(0.317) (0.312) (0.317) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.047)
Control Mean -8.975 -9.611 -9.096 10.342 10.215 10.354 0.795 0.695 0.774
Share owns radio (2015) Share radio news (2015) Radio coverage (2016)
Invite -0.041** -0.020 -0.035* -0.035 -0.017 -0.039* -0.172 -0.138 -0.010
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (1.222) (1.159) (1.190)
Control Mean 0.771 0.750 0.774 0.778 0.767 0.780 13.552 11.275 12.895
Debate week Share sec. ed. (2008) Share 18+ (2008)
Invite -0.035 0.031 -0.026 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.193) (0.184) (0.179) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Control Mean 4.162 4.148 3.980 0.160 0.146 0.154 0.488 0.485 0.487
Observations 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A2.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A7. Individual-level balance (individual covariates)
Survey date Education
Invite -1.063** -0.796 -1.006* 0.067 0.102 0.081
(0.523) (0.572) (0.573) (0.086) (0.084) (0.075)
Control Mean 71.801 71.153 71.422 6.586 6.447 6.534
Age Male
Invite 0.163 0.359 0.225 0.011 0.025 0.021
(0.439) (0.464) (0.437) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Control Mean 31.728 32.103 31.877 0.746 0.744 0.740
Observations 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors
clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A8. Polling Station-level Balance (district covariates)
VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 1st place (2011) VS of 3rd place (2011)
Invite -0.015 -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Control Mean 0.308 0.309 0.309 0.183 0.184 0.184 0.129 0.129 0.129
Turnout (2011) Share ran in 2011 VS HHI (2011)
Invite -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 -0.018 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Control Mean 0.665 0.667 0.667 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.188 0.188 0.188
N. candidates (2017) Incumbent ran (2017) Number of debates
Invite -0.648 -0.506 -0.677 -0.050 -0.019 -0.053 -0.124 -0.083 -0.130
(0.771) (0.715) (0.798) (0.067) (0.070) (0.066) (0.118) (0.109) (0.121)
Control Mean 14.651 14.794 14.794 0.883 0.890 0.890 2.239 2.256 2.256
Log pop. dens. (2008) Log reg. voters (2017) GSM coverage (2016)
Invite 0.178 0.255 0.154 0.062 0.056 0.060 0.010 0.032 0.005
(0.322) (0.314) (0.320) (0.048) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.047)
Control Mean -9.223 -9.097 -9.097 10.325 10.352 10.352 0.753 0.775 0.775
Share owns radio (2015) Share radio news (2015) Radio coverage (2016)
Invite -0.031 -0.019 -0.033* -0.037* -0.017 -0.038* -0.001 -0.100 -0.065
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (1.201) (1.157) (1.199)
Control Mean 0.770 0.773 0.773 0.778 0.780 0.780 12.485 12.919 12.919
Debate week Share sec. ed. (2008) Share 18+ (2008)
Invite -0.041 0.029 -0.046 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.176) (0.185) (0.178) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Control Mean 4.007 3.987 3.987 0.152 0.154 0.154 0.486 0.487 0.487
Observations 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383
Weight No 1/PS Reg No 1/PS Reg No 1/PS Reg
Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A2.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors clustered at the district-
level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A9. Polling Station-level Balance (PS covariates)
N. PS in VRC (2017) N. PS in VRC (2011)
Invite -0.099 0.008 -0.121 -0.114 -0.011 -0.142
(0.247) (0.226) (0.249) (0.185) (0.183) (0.186)
Control Mean 3.605 3.807 3.807 3.399 3.571 3.571
New VRC Urban
Invite -0.014 -0.008 -0.015 0.067 0.079 0.063
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059)
Control Mean 0.111 0.101 0.101 0.299 0.326 0.326
Reg. Voters (2017) Reg. Voters (2011)
Invite 2.247 4.668 0.686 -53.204 0.239 -67.706
(6.170) (6.416) (4.775) (90.770) (89.758) (90.943)
Control Mean 403.792 418.480 418.480 1439.977 1526.086 1526.086
Turnout (2011) Invalid votes (2011)
Invite 0.014 0.011 0.015* 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Control Mean 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.066 0.066 0.066
Radio covered Radio intensity
Invite -0.016 0.012 -0.025 0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.848 0.858 0.858 0.046 0.045 0.045
Observations 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383 5383
Weight No 1/PS Reg No 1/PS Reg
Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A2. Analysis throughout is at the
polling station-level, where multiple polling stations exist within a single location
called a VRC. 1780/2080 VRCs existed in the 2011 election; for these 300 new VRCs
we assign district-level averages.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors
clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A10. Incumbent Balance
Attendance Absent Distant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invite 0.034 0.019 -0.003 0.013 -0.025 -0.023
(0.032) (0.030) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
Mean 0.791 0.807 0.117 0.114 0.079 0.066
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73
Weight None Reg None Reg None Reg
Outcome variables are plenary session attendance measures taken from leg-
islator scorecards for 2016. Legislators either attend, are absent, or are away
from Monrovia for each plenary session.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard




Response Age Univ. ed. Radio Male Ran before Gov job Advocacy NGO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. All candidates
Invite -0.028 -0.379 0.012 0.020 0.009 -0.024 -0.028 0.064 0.065
(0.031) (1.064) (0.049) (0.013) (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.036)
Control Mean 0.63 48.48 0.55 0.03 0.85 0.30 0.34 0.83 0.38
Observations 984 608 612 612 612 612 612 612 612
B. Incumbents
Invite 0.139 2.394 0.061 -0.030 0.121 0.000 -0.394 -0.121 0.061
(0.131) (4.085) (0.210) (0.200) (0.174) (.) (0.212) (0.174) (0.255)
Control Mean 0.42 55.31 0.69 0.15 0.77 1.00 0.69 0.92 0.23
Observations 64 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
C. Challengers
Invite 0.010 3.875 -0.005 -0.002 0.027 0.134 0.036 0.155 0.175
(0.083) (1.655) (0.106) (0.052) (0.067) (0.102) (0.086) (0.065) (0.103)
Control Mean 0.64 47.31 0.65 0.06 0.90 0.35 0.31 0.81 0.29
Observations 155 99 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Panel A presents unweighted balance tests for the full set of candidates in survey, Panel B restricts to incumbent candidates,
Panel C restricts to predicted challenger candidates. Outcome variables are: response rate to survey; age in years; indicator
for whether candidate completed university; indicator for whether they own or manage a radio station; indicator for can-
didate being male; indicator for candidate having run for office before; indicator for candidate having a government job
before; indicator for candidate having advocacy experience; indicator for candidate working for an NGO before.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A12. Candidate-level Balance (weighted)
Response Age Univ ed Radio Male Ran before Gov job Advocacy NGO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. All candidates
Invite -0.045 -0.171 -0.013 0.030 0.025 -0.031 -0.018 0.043 0.057
(0.033) (0.899) (0.056) (0.017) (0.031) (0.036) (0.039) (0.027) (0.037)
Mean 0.63 48.48 0.55 0.03 0.85 0.30 0.34 0.83 0.38
Observations 984 608 612 612 612 612 612 612 612
B. Challengers
Invite -0.037 4.918 0.042 0.008 0.008 0.153 0.054 0.144 0.165
(0.064) (1.815) (0.105) (0.064) (0.068) (0.106) (0.094) (0.068) (0.101)
Mean 0.78 47.31 0.65 0.06 0.90 0.35 0.31 0.81 0.29
Observations 155 99 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
In this table we weight observations by the inverse of the number of responding candidate types in a given district. Since
there is one incumbent per district, for incumbents this would be identical to Panel B of Table A11 and thus we omit it.
Panel A presents balance tests for the full set of candidates in survey, Panel B restricts predicted challenger candidates.
Outcome variables are: response rate to survey; age in years; indicator for whether candidate completed university; indica-
tor for whether they own or manage a radio station; indicator for candidate being male; indicator for candidate having
run for office before; indicator for candidate having a government job before; indicator for candidate having advocacy
experience; indicator for candidate working for an NGO before.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A19
A.6.3 Demography-weighted specifications
A13. Candidate Debate Participation
(demography-weighted)
(1) (2)
A. Share of candidates
Invite 0.077** 0.077**
(0.034) (0.033)






Control Mean 0.280 0.299
Observations 4060 4060
Weight No Dem
C. Share of challengers
Invite 0.212*** 0.214***
(0.074) (0.073)
Control Mean 0.492 0.528
Observations 4060 4060
Weight No Dem
D. Share of other candidates
Invite 0.003 0.002
(0.030) (0.029)
Control Mean 0.562 0.575
Observations 3991 3991
Weight No Dem
Outcome variables are the share of the respective set of candi-
dates (winner, actual challenger) who attended a debate out
of all candidates in that district. Actual challengers are de-
fined as candidates who ranked in the top three in their race
in the election but were not the incumbent. Actual other can-
didates are those who did not rank in the top three. Panels
A and B have 4060 observations; Panel C has fewer due to
only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no
‘actual other candidates’ defined).
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block
FE, enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level con-
trols. For weighted specifications, ’Dem’ weights observa-
tions to be representative at the district-level with respect
to gender and education. Standard errors clustered at the
district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A20
A14. Voting Outcomes (demography-weighted)
Interaction term:
Main effect Std. Performance Std. Policy alignment
1. Respondent-level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.045** 0.042* 0.049** 0.046** 0.041** 0.038*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
Invite × Std. ̂performance 0.067* 0.063
(0.038) (0.040)
Invite × Std. policy alignment 0.042*** 0.051**
(0.016) (0.021)
Control Mean 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496 3496
B. Challengers
Invite -0.048*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.048*** -0.052***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016)
Invite × Std. ̂performance -0.015 -0.026
(0.046) (0.051)
Invite × Std. policy alignment -0.006 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008)
Control Mean 0.156 0.160 0.156 0.160 0.156 0.160
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684 8684
Weight No Dem No Dem No Dem
Panel 1: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether respondent expressed voting for the leading
candidate at endline. Columns 1-3 report the main effects, Columns 4-6 include interactions of treat-
ment assignment with standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance, and
Columns 7-9 include interactions with standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of prefer-
ence alignment measured at baseline. Section 4.2 explains these interaction terms further.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level and
individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Dem’ weights observations to be representative
at the district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered at the district-level
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A15. Debate Exposure (demography-weighted)
(1) (2)




















Outcome variables: Panel A: a standardized index of (1) indicator for
whether the respondent had not heard their district debate at baseline
but had at endline (2) indicator for whether the respondent had heard
the debate at endline (3) the number of times the respondent had heard
the debate at endline. Panel B: a standardized index of (1) indicator for
whether the respondent’s stated debate winner actually attended the
debate (2) share of candidates respondent claims participated (3) share
of predicted leading candidates respondent claims participated. Panel
C: a standardized index of the change in how many factual questions
about CSDF management respondents answered correctly between
baseline and endline. Panel D: a standardized index of (1) change in
how much respondents listened to the radio (2) change in how much
they discussed politics with their friends (3) how much they accessed
other sources of political information.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enu-
merator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted
specifications, ’Dem’ weights observations to be representative at the
district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors
clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
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1. Uncertainty (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.178* 0.162 0.169** 0.211***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.074) (0.078)
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496
Weight No Dem No Dem
B. Challengers
Invite 0.037 0.047 0.139** 0.072
(0.066) (0.078) (0.061) (0.070)
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684





2. Levels (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Incumbent
Invite 0.098 0.134 0.089 0.054
(0.075) (0.099) (0.065) (0.067)
Observations 3496 3496 3496 3496
Weight No Dem No Dem
B. Challengers
Invite -0.078 -0.055 0.038 0.012
(0.075) (0.083) (0.065) (0.084)
Observations 8684 8684 8684 8684
Weight No Dem No Dem
Panels 1.A and 1.B: the outcome variable in columns 1-3 is the stan-
dardized change in certainty respondents express about candidate
competence between baseline and endline, and in columns 4-6 is
the standardized change in certainty respondents express about
candidate priority issues between baseline and endline. Panels 2.A
and 2.B: the outcome variable in columns 1-3 is the standardized
change in respondent perception about candidate competence be-
tween baseline and endline, and in columns 4-6 is the standardized
learning that respondents reflect about candidate priority issues
between baseline and endline.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE,
enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For
weighted specifications, ’Dem’ weights observations to be repre-
sentative at the district-level with respect to gender and education.
Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A17. Candidate Campaigning (demography-
weighted)
Ground Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Incumbent
Invite -0.055 -0.106** 0.082** 0.083**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038)
Observations 3492 3492 3496 3496
Weight No Dem No Dem
B. Challengers
Invite -0.060* -0.089*** -0.025 0.003
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032)
Observations 8676 8676 8684 8684
Weight No Dem No Dem
Outcome variable in columns 1-3 is a standardized index of how
often candidates (1) visited (2) distributed leaflets (3) bought votes
in respondents’ communities during campaigning. Outcome vari-
able in columns 4-6 is a standardized measure of how often re-
spondents heard candidates on the radio in the two weeks before
the election.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE,
enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For
weighted specifications, ’Dem’ weights observations to be repre-
sentative at the district-level with respect to gender and education.
Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.6.4 Effects on individual outcomes
A25
A18. Debate Exposure (supplementary)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Debate listening index
(1) Change in heard debate
Invite 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.102***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Control Mean 0.084 0.082 0.082
(2) Heard debate
Invite 0.038* 0.035* 0.050**
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Control Mean 0.195 0.202 0.193
(3) Number of times heard
Invite 0.085* 0.104** 0.120***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Control Mean 0.420 0.440 0.420
B. Debate knowledge index
(1) Debate winner attended debate
Invite 0.075** 0.078*** 0.096***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Control Mean 0.291 0.297 0.283
(2) Stated share of participating candidates
Invite 0.023 0.024 0.031**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Control Mean 0.111 0.115 0.111
(3) Stated share of participating leading candidates
Invite 0.030* 0.026* 0.039**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Control Mean 0.145 0.153 0.148
C. Policy knowledge index
(1) Manager of CSDF
Invite 0.041 0.053 0.044
(0.029) (0.038) (0.032)
Control Mean 0.237 0.231 0.243
(2) CSDF reporting requirement
Invite -0.011 0.018 -0.008
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033)
Control Mean 0.247 0.249 0.247
(3) CSDF citizen involvement requirement
Invite 0.094** 0.113** 0.114**
(0.040) (0.051) (0.045)
Control Mean 0.246 0.246 0.244
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
D. Political information demand index
(1) Change in radio listening
Invite 0.285** 0.451*** 0.370**
(0.134) (0.164) (0.160)
Control Mean 0.233 0.213 0.232
(2) Demand for non-radio information sources
Invite 0.143* 0.168* 0.179**
(0.075) (0.085) (0.083)
Control Mean 4.970 4.800 4.932
(3) Change in political discussion with friends
Invite 0.510*** 0.516** 0.491**
(0.189) (0.226) (0.193)
Control Mean -0.124 -0.106 -0.117
All outcome variables are described in Section A.4.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block
FE, enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level controls.
For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observa-
tions in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters
in that district. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A19. Candidate Campaigning (supplementary)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Incumbent
(1) Candidate visited community
Invite -0.041** -0.050** -0.048**
(0.016) (0.023) (0.021)
Control Mean 0.823 0.824 0.820
(2) Candidate distributed leaflets
Invite -0.014 -0.013 -0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
Control Mean 0.935 0.933 0.932
(3) Vote buying for candidate
Invite 0.008 0.056 0.073
(0.053) (0.052) (0.050)
Control Mean 2.258 2.223 2.231
Observations 3493 3493 3493
B. Challenger
(1) Candidate visited community
Invite -0.036*** -0.029** -0.036***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Control Mean 0.756 0.753 0.753
(2) Candidate distributed leaflets
Invite -0.021*** -0.019** -0.022**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Control Mean 0.905 0.908 0.907
(3) Vote buying for candidate
Invite -0.014 -0.030 -0.007
(0.037) (0.041) (0.040)
Control Mean 2.109 2.145 2.132
Observations 8678 8678 8678
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
All outcome variables are described in Section A.4.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enu-
merator FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted
specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in that district and
’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Standard er-
rors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,




A20. Candidate Debate Participation (district
level)
(1) (2)
A. Share of candidates
Invite 0.087 0.111*
(0.056) (0.056)






Control Mean 0.371 0.300
Observations 73 73
Weight No Reg
C. Share of challengers
Invite 0.164 0.233*
(0.122) (0.117)
Control Mean 0.552 0.528
Observations 73 73
Weight No Reg
D. Share of other candidates
Invite 0.014 0.011
(0.055) (0.056)
Control Mean 0.583 0.575
Observations 71 71
Weight No Reg
Outcome variables are the share of the respective set of candi-
dates (all, incumbent, predicted challenger, other candidate)
who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district.
Panels A-C have 73 observations; Panel D has fewer due to
only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no
‘other candidates’ defined). For weighted specifications, ’Reg’
is the number of registered voters in that district.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block
FE. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A21. Candidate Debate Participation (supplementary)
(1) (2)
A. Election winner
Invite 0.253** 0.202** 0.275***
(0.097) (0.089) (0.093)
Control Mean 0.501 0.520 0.474
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Share of actual challengers
Invite 0.267*** 0.176** 0.237***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Control Mean 0.488 0.572 0.525
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
C. Share of actual other candidates
Invite 0.018 0.029 0.036
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038)
Control Mean 0.563 0.584 0.584
Observations 3991 3991 3991
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variables are the share of the respective set of candidates (winner, actual
challenger) who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district. Actual chal-
lengers are defined as candidates who ranked in the top three in their race in the
election but were not the incumbent. Actual other candidates are those who did not
rank in the top three. Panels A and B have 4060 observations; Panel C has fewer
due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no ‘actual other
candidates’ defined).
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE,
district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the
number of observations in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters
in that district. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p <





Invite 0.387 -0.700 -0.206
(0.998) (0.860) (0.974)
Control Mean 5.230 5.618 5.466
B. Radio survey
Invite 1.055 0.326 0.746
(1.044) (0.906) (0.954)
Control Mean 7.473 7.702 7.698
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variables are, in Panel A, the number of contracted re-
broadcasts confirmed by radio monitors and, in panel B, Num-
ber of rebroadcasts based on survey of radio stations, includ-
ing those not contracted to rebroadcast but recorded as being
present in the debate venue.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block
FE, enumerator FE, district-level and individual-level controls.
For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observa-
tions in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters
in that district. Standard errors clustered at the district-level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A23. Vote Choice Reason
Campaign promises Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invite 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.024
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Control Mean 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.067 0.064 0.063
Competence Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invite 0.013 0.016 0.001 -0.024 -0.001 -0.008
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Control Mean 0.196 0.209 0.201 0.262 0.254 0.258
Observations 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variable is an indicator for whether respondents switched towards citing candidate
campaign promises, expectated policy by the candidate, candidate competence or candidate
experience as their main reason for their vote choice.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level
and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations
in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors




A. Media: trust and bias
Invite -0.007 -0.003 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
B. Media: helps democracy
Invite -0.003 -0.004 -0.015
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
C. Electoral attitudes
Invite 0.010 0.013 0.004
(0.027) (0.031) (0.029)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variables are all z-score indices. Panel A: extent to which the me-
dia (1) was unbiased during election (2) gave equal coverage of candidates
(3) is trustworthy. Panel B: media (1) helps select competent representa-
tives (2) ensures representatives reflect views of voters. Panel C: elections
(1) help select competent representatives (2) ensure representatives reflect
views of voters.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumera-
tor FE, district-level and individual-level controls. For weighted specifica-
tions, ’Obs’ is the number of observations in that district and ’Reg’ is the
number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors clustered at





Rebroadcast 0.177 0.139 0.178
(0.112) (0.108) (0.126)
Observations 4060 4060 4060
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
(1) (2) (3)
B. Respondents in intensive-invite districts
Rebroadcast -0.025 -0.026 0.026
(0.186) (0.157) (0.191)
Observations 2252 2252 2252
Weight No 1/Obs Reg/Obs
Outcome variable is our standardized index of debate exposure. In Panel A, we show no over-
all effects on debate exposure. In Panel B, we show no effects on debate exposure if we restrict
to respondents in those districts assigned to high invitation intensity.
All specifications are estimated using OLS and include block FE, enumerator FE, district-level
and individual-level controls. For weighted specifications, ’Obs’ is the number of observations
in that district and ’Reg’ is the number of registered voters in that district. Standard errors
clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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